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ABSTRACT
Rote use of a standard-form contract term can erode its meaning, a
phenomenon made worse when the process of encrustation introduces
various formulations of the term. When they occur, rote usage and
encrustation weaken the communicative properties of boilerplate
terms, leading some terms to lose much, if not all, meaning. In theory,
if a clause is emptied of meaning, it can create a contractual black hole
in which, as the term loses meaning, random variations in language
appear and persist. What, then, are the consequences if parties exploit
these variations in language by successfully advancing an interpretation
the market disavows? Traditional doctrine holds that even if the court
errs in the meaning it gives to a clause, parties have an incentive
promptly to revise the standard language to exclude the aberrant
interpretation. But what if the assumptions about the costs and
motivations to revise this type of boilerplate are wrong? We seek
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purchase on this question with a study of the pari passu clause, a
standard provision in sovereign debt contracts that almost no one
seems to understand. This clause gained fame in 2011 because of a
series of court decisions in New York arguably misinterpreting a
particular variation of the clause. Even though the courts’
interpretation put at risk a multitrillion dollar debt market, meaningful
revisions to the language of the boilerplate term did not begin to appear
until late 2014. In the interim, trillions of dollars in bonds were issued
with an uncorrected version of the term. Market forces, in other words,
worked slowly to remedy a systemic problem that caused substantial
costs. We ask whether the state could do more to avoid the problem at
the front end rather than depend on market forces to correct court error
at the back end.
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INTRODUCTION
A question that courts face whenever they are asked to interpret
a standard provision in a commercial contract is how to determine what
the parties understood that provision to mean when they contracted.
The interpretive goal in contract cases is to recover and then enforce
the parties’ apparent intentions, as they existed at the time of
contracting. This goal implies that courts will attempt to interpret even
ambiguous terms in a manner consistent with the ex ante intentions of
the contracting parties in so far as a court can recover those intentions
from the contract or the surrounding context.1 But standardized terms
in boilerplate contracts between sophisticated parties are vulnerable to
misinterpretation. At the limit, a boilerplate term that is reused for
decades and without reflection merely because it is part of a standardform package of terms, can be emptied of any recoverable meaning:
this creates a contractual black hole.2 More commonly, terms that have

1. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113
YALE L.J. 541, 568–69 (2003). Intention is “determined objectively and prospectively: A party is
taken to mean what” a “contract partner could plausibly believe it meant when the parties
contracted.” Id. at 569. As the arbiter of disputed interpretations, the court determines the
meaning of whatever signals of intention the parties agreed to. While the court presumably knows
what the default rules it implies in every contract mean, it does not know the intended meaning
of those terms that were chosen by the parties.
2. The concept of the black hole derives from theoretical physics. Stephen Hawking’s work
on black holes suggested that no “information” can escape from a black hole—once it is pulled
past the event horizon, it is lost. Horizon: The Hawking Paradox, BBC Two television broadcast
(Sept. 15, 2005). In the sense we use the concept here, the parties’ original understanding of what
a clause meant can, in theory, be lost entirely by the process of repetition and the insertion of
random variations: once drawn into a black hole, it is lost forever. In the last two years, however,
Hawking has decided that he was wrong and while some information can escape, it is so degraded
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lost much meaning still may provoke litigation over essentially
meaningless variations in the boilerplate language. In this latter case of
contractual grey holes,3 courts may be functionally incapable of
devising a plausible meaning that was attached to the linguistic
variations at the time the contract was drafted. Thus, regardless of
whether a boilerplate term has lost all or only almost all meaning,
courts will face an interpretation conundrum that we collectively term
the “black hole” problem.4
The dilemma that courts sometimes face when interpreting
boilerplate is an inherent cost of the reliance on standardized contract
terms in commercial contracts. Boilerplate terms are ubiquitous in
commercial contracting because they offer the efficiency advantages of
standardization. Those advantages include the development of a
uniform system of communication that is independent of any particular
contractual context.5 Thus, parties in heterogeneous environments who
as to be virtually useless. See David Castelvecci, Physicists Split by Hawking Paper, 529 NATURE
448, 448 (2016) (noting that Hawking’s recent paper “suggest[s] a mechanism for transferring
[some] information to the black hole”); Clara Moskowitz, Stephen Hawking Hasn’t Solved the
Black Hole Paradox Just Yet, SCI. AM. (Aug. 27, 2015), https://www.scientificamerican.com/
article/stephen-hawking-hasn-t-solved-the-black-hole-paradox-just-yet [https://perma.cc/QD6K5Z6Y] (quoting Hawking as stating “[t]he information about the ingoing particles is returned but
in a chaotically useless form”). This, then, is the “grey hole” concept. See infra note 3 and text
accompanying notes 18–42.
3. David Dyzenhaus has distinguished the different characteristics of legal black holes and
grey holes. See generally DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW: LEGALITY IN A
TIME OF EMERGENCY 41–42 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2006). In his terms, grey holes are situations
where “there are some legal constraints . . . but the constraints are so insubstantial that they pretty
well permit [an actor] to do as it pleases.” Id. at 42. A black hole, in contrast, does not even
pretend to constrain. It is a “lawless void.” Id. at 41. Thus, in the sense we use here, the contractual
black hole is the limiting case of a boilerplate term that lacks any meaning whatsoever. A grey
hole, in contrast, cannot excuse all possible meanings, but the meaning that has survived is
incapable of providing a basis for making legal distinctions among the variations in language that
have appeared over time. Id. at 42. Thus, even for grey holes, where some evidence on the
meaning of the contractual term remains, this evidence may be so minimal or contradictory as to
leave courts effectively with little guidance on how to apply this meaning in litigation. Since the
interpretive issues are the same with both black and grey holes, we use the generic term “black
hole” to refer to the range of problems caused by the loss of contextual meaning.
4. Douglas Baird, in analyzing this question, uses the term “skeumorph.” See Douglas G.
Baird, Pari Passu Clauses and the Skeumorph Problem in Contract Law, 67 DUKE L.J. ONLINE
(forthcoming Oct. 2017).
5. Standardized terms provide a uniform, and therefore intelligible, system of
communication. See, e.g., Lon Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 801–03
(1941) (describing the “channeling function” of legal formality). This standardizing “function is
analogous to governmental provision of regulated standards of weights, measures and generic
product names,” and it offers contracting parties “similar communicative advantages.” Charles J.
Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between
Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 261, 286–88 (1985).
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wish to communicate a shared intent can embody that intent in a fixed
and reliable formulation whose meaning does not vary with the nature
of the contract or its context.6 Unfortunately, the very elements of fixed
and unchanging meaning that make boilerplate terms attractive are the
same elements that can lead to the process of repetition without
reflection that contributes to the erosion of that meaning over time.
In addition to the ordinary risks of obsolescence, the repetitious
use of boilerplate has two pernicious effects that can undermine the
utility of some boilerplate terms. The first effect is “rote usage”: some
standardized terms may get used by rote so consistently that they lose
a shared meaning and become a ritualized legal incantation.7
“Encrustation” is a second cost of too much repetition: the
intelligibility of language deteriorates significantly as legal jargon is
added to standard formulations, leading to linguistic variations of the
same clause.8 This process further weakens the communicative
properties of boilerplate terms, reducing even more their reliability as
signals of what the parties really meant.9 In combination, terms that
develop linguistic variations and thereafter are repeated by rote, even
after the original meaning has been largely lost, can become
contractual black holes.
Contractual black holes present a heightened risk that courts may
be persuaded to adopt an interpretation of the term at issue that is
antithetical to the functioning of a market that relies on the standard
contract to regulate the rights and duties of the participating parties.
The market may have disregarded the term before a court gives the
black hole a contemporary interpretation. Nonetheless, the market
may have an understanding of what the term does not mean, often
6. See Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 691 F.2d 1039, 1048–51 (2d Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1012 (1983) (discussing the importance of boilerplate language in
successor obligor clauses); Broad v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 943 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981) (“A large degree of uniformity in the language of debenture
indentures is essential to the effective functioning of the financial markets: uniformity of the
indentures that govern competing debenture issues is what makes it possible meaningfully to
compare one debenture issue with another . . . .”); see also Howard S. Steel, Elnaz Zarrini &
Arkady A. Goldinstein, NML Capital v. Argentina: A Lesson in Indenture Interpretation, 8
INSOLVENCY & RESTRUCTURING INT’L 31, 32 (2014) (discussing the uniformity in pari passu
clauses).
7. For a description of black holes and the rote usage phenomenon, see infra text
accompanying notes 19–32.
8. The eminent British lawyer, Philip R. Wood, has described the process of encrustation
as akin to that of barnacles accumulating on a ship’s hull. PHILIP WOOD, ALLEN & OVERY LLP,
LIFE AFTER LEHMAN: CHANGES IN MARKET PRACTICE 9 (2009).
9. Goetz & Scott, supra note 5, at 289; see infra text accompanying notes 19–32.
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because of the high cost to market participants of an aberrant
interpretation. Unfortunately, correcting the courts’ interpretation in
such a case can be a slow and difficult process, even when the judicial
error imposes high costs. This resistance to revision is a function of
what we will call the “evidentiary vacuum” that results when a term
loses its original meaning and lacks an evidentiary record of its
contemporary meaning. Here the chance of a court issuing an aberrant
interpretation is heightened as compared with a boilerplate term with
a well-known meaning.
These conditions appear to describe the case of the pari passu
clause, a boilerplate formulation common to sovereign debt contracts
for nearly 200 years whose contemporary meaning was hopelessly
unclear.10 The recent history of judicial interpretation of this clause
began in Brussels in a case against the Republic of Peru in September
2000, in which a court issued the first interpretation of the clause in at
least a half century.11 The same interpretation of pari passu was
affirmed by a federal court in New York in a case against the Republic
of Argentina in December 2011,12 and affirmed again on appeal in that
same case in October 201213 and August 2013.14 In each of these cases,
the courts endorsed an interpretation of a particular variation of pari
passu that required holdout creditors to be paid in full as a condition
to the sovereigns paying consenting creditors under a restructuring
agreement. Even though this interpretation effectively undermined
efforts by sovereigns to restructure their bonds, and even though the
courts’ interpretation was widely vilified in the market, meaningful
revisions to the language of the boilerplate term did not even begin to
appear until late 2014.15
The extent of rote usage and encrustation in commonly used
boilerplate remains an open question because the issue is only now
10. MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE TRANSACTION:
BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACTUAL DESIGN 3, 51–52, 109–18 (Univ. of Chicago
Press 2013) (describing the almost universal ignorance of market participants as to the purpose
and meaning of the pari passu clause in sovereign bond contracts).
11. For an English translation of the Brussels case, see Joint Appendix at A-1356, NML
Capital, Ltd. V. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. 12-105(L)).
12. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 08 Civ. 6978, 2011 WL 9522565, at *2–
3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2011).
13. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2012).
14. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 2013).
15. See generally Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott, Variation in Boilerplate:
Rational Design or Random Mutation, 19 AM. L. & ECON. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (reporting
on data concerning the use of pari passu clauses after June 2011).
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beginning to be examined by legal and economic scholars.16 But
preliminary evidence from other markets where standard form
contracts are ubiquitous suggests that the pari passu saga is
representative of a larger phenomenon, extending beyond sovereign
bond contracts to other contexts where boilerplate is commonly used,
including insurance and merger and acquisition agreements.17 To the
extent this problem exists more broadly, it argues for a shift in contract
doctrine away from the futile and ultimately costly effort to discover a
shared meaning that no longer exists.18 In this Article, we explore
whether courts, or other state actors, might better deal with contractual
black holes in boilerplate contracts. Our purpose is to begin the
scholarly focus on the effects of this phenomenon by using the pari
passu story as a prototypical exemplar. We use both qualitative and
quantitative data to support the claim that courts searching for shared
intent in the case of black holes in standardized contracting can result
in substantial social costs.
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we focus on identifying
the causes and effects of black holes in standard form commercial

16. In addition to the pari passu term, there are other terms in sovereign bonds themselves,
such as the negative pledge clause, that may well have become black holes. One can also find such
potential black holes elsewhere, such as the tax revenue pledges that underlie many municipal
bonds in the United States. Insurance contracts appear to be another area with the potential for
such terms. See Christopher C. French, Understanding Insurance Policies as Noncontracts: An
Alternative Approach to Drafting and Construing These Unique Financial Instruments, 89 TEMP.
L. REV. 535, 547–48 (2017) (describing conditions ripe for the generation of black holes). French
explains:
Many of the terms and conditions contained in standard form ISO [Insurance Service
Office, Inc.] policies were drafted many years ago and are reused each time ISO issues
new versions of the policy form. For example, the policy language in the 1943 New
York Standard Fire Insurance Policy is still used today in some homeowners’ insurance
policies. Because much of the standard form policy language used today was drafted
long ago, the original drafters are often dead or unknown. Documentation regarding
the drafters’ intent also rarely exists. Consequently, it is difficult, if not impossible, to
discern the drafters’ intent if the policy language is ambiguous.
Id. at 547–48.
17. A number of forthcoming papers, from an April 2017 conference on Contractual Black
Holes, discuss the conditions under which black holes are more or less likely to occur. The papers
are available at Contractual Black Holes, NYU POLLACK CTR. FOR LAW & BUS.,
http://www.law.nyu.edu/centers/pollackcenterlawbusiness/events/contractualblackholes [https://
perma.cc/FK2J-DME7].
18. The underlying canon of contract interpretation directs courts to give every term and
clause in a contract a meaning, under the assumption that parties have drafted terms in a contract
to convey their collective purposes. In NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, the Second
Circuit put it this way: “A contract should not be interpreted in such a way as would leave one of
its provisions substantially without force or effect.” NML Capital, Ltd., 699 F.3d at 258 (citing
Singh v. Atakhanian, 818 N.Y.S.2d 524, 526 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006)).
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boilerplate. We show how both agency and coordination costs peculiar
to the inertia that results from black holes can undermine the standard
assumption that commercial parties will promptly revise an
unanticipated interpretation that generates market inefficiencies. Part
II frames the inquiry: Does the celebrated dispute over the meaning of
the pari passu clause provide evidence that the current means of
revising black holes impose large and uncompensated social costs? In
Part III, we evaluate a dataset on pari passu clauses assembled from
over 1500 sovereign and quasi-sovereign issuances in the period from
June 1, 2011 to May 30, 2016, together with interviews with the
participants in the market. Part IV discusses the implications of the
finding that, at least in certain markets, commercial actors face
extraordinary difficulties in repairing black hole boilerplate following
what the market perceives as an aberrant judicial interpretation of the
term’s contemporary meaning. These difficulties present a collective
action problem whose solution can be daunting owing to the
combination of coordination and agency costs that may impair the
efficiency of standardized commercial contracting in large-scale
markets.
I. WHEN STANDARDIZED CONTRACT TERMS BECOME ROTE AND
ENCRUSTED
We earlier introduced the concept of black holes in terms of two
related but independent factors that contribute to the unintelligibility
of standardized language. The first, rote usage, results when, despite
many years of repetitive usage, no serious legal challenges or other
methods of validation affirm the meaning of a routinely invoked term.19
The absence of disputes over a widely used but poorly understood
term, or of a collective process of updating the meaning of such
standard terms,20 disables courts or other authoritative bodies from
19. The legal recognition of certain words and phrases preserves a reliable meaning to
boilerplate terms. “Since the legal system retains ultimate power over interpretation and
enforcement, parties cannot be certain what effect will be given to any formulation until it is
tested.” Goetz & Scott, supra note 5, at 278. “Definitional recognition does not change the
optional character of these terms,” but it “does confer upon them the status of ‘invocations,’ terms
that once deliberately” included in a contract “have a legally circumscribed meaning that will be
heavily—perhaps even irrebuttably—presumed.” Id. at 282. What ultimately can result from rote
usage is a term that is widely used because market participants assume it must have a meaning,
but, in fact, it does not.
20. An example of a collective effort to update standard terms is the International Chamber
of Commerce’s publication of Incoterms, the international rules for the interpretation of trade
terms. See INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INCOTERMS (2010). Each of the eleven Incoterms
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providing parties with a tested interpretation of the boilerplate term
that minimizes the risks of unintended effects. Rote usage may also
develop as a species of contractual overkill, for example, as in forms
that designate already enforceable agreements as “signed and
sealed.”21 In effect, these rote terms become platitudes.22 Nonetheless,
the linguistic formulation continues to be retained and repeated
because “parties see no reason to eliminate a term they view as costless
and thus incur a risk, however small, of jeopardizing” the market’s
understanding of their agreement.23 Encrustation is a second cost of too
much repetition: the intelligibility of language deteriorates significantly
as legal jargon and other linguistic variations are overlaid on standard
formulations. Rote usage and encrustation are related phenomena
although they may affect some boilerplate terms independently.24
When combined in a particular clause or phrase, a term becomes
linguistically uncertain, as no particular meaning can be uncovered that
is more probable than any other meaning.
It is important to distinguish the linguistic uncertainty that creates
black holes from the more familiar interpretive challenges courts face
when interpreting ambiguous terms. A term is ambiguous when it is
“capable of more than one sensible and reasonable interpretation.”25
Terms that are linguistically uncertain in the sense we use here are not
ambiguous but rather are acontextual. The term in question can apply
to an infinitely wide spectrum of referents, as opposed to one or more

sets forth a number of substantive rules, including, most importantly, the point at which risk of
loss passes from the seller to the buyer. Id. A contemporary example of updating comes from the
International Swap Dealers Association (ISDA), whose rules, standard forms and definitions are
continually revised by a standing committee. See Stephen J. Choi & Mitu Gulati, Contract as
Statute, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1139–42 (2006) (explaining the emergence and activities of
ISDA); Anna Gelpern, Public Promises and Organizational Agendas, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 57, 63–67
(2009) (describing ISDA’s “contract-drafting and related activities”).
21. For a discussion of the deterioration of the sealed instrument from a prima facie signal
of legal enforcement to a meaningless rote incantation, see ROBERT E. SCOTT & JODY S. KRAUS,
CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 141–43 (5th ed. 2013).
22. As Goetz and Scott explain:
Ordinary social relations are similarly replete with phrases that have lost their
literal meaning through rote usage. The person who asks ‘How are you?’ usually does
not mean to inquire about your health. Similarly, ‘Have a nice day,’ an unusual
expression of friendliness a few years ago has now lost most of its meaning and become
a ritual salutation from personnel in many retail establishments.
Goetz & Scott, supra note 5, at 288 n.73.
23. Id. at 288.
24. Id.
25. Ross Bros. Constr. Co. v. State ex rel. Transp. Comm’n Highway Div., 650 P.2d 1080,
1082 (Or. Ct. App. 1982).
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reasonable alternatives, because there is no basis in the relevant
context to determine what, if any, shared meaning exists.
What, then, is the mechanism that produces an encrustation that
is then repeated by rote in standard boilerplate? Those running the
deals in standard markets describe the process in the following terms:
Lawyers hired to do a deal for clients—such as a bond offering—are
instructed to use market-standard forms so far as possible. But the
deals have to be tailored to the client’s needs as appropriate. Names,
dates, locations for payment, currencies, and other items have to be
changed from whatever prior deal document is being used as a
template. The client’s assumption is that the lawyers possess the
expertise to make the necessary marginal modifications to the standard
forms to insure that they both fit the client’s preferences and do not
depart significantly from what the market would consider the standard
package. But lawyers working with standard form language repeated
for many years by rote are unlikely to have much, if any, understanding
of the purpose served by these terms. The combination, then, of
making marginal modifications to the contract terms to suit the needs
of the transaction, coupled with ignorance of the terms’ function, can
result in the insertion of legal language that attempts to, but ultimately
fails at, adding clarity to the terms. These insertions may occur with
greater frequency when the attorneys involved have less experience
with the particular boilerplate term.26
Encrustation thus results from adapting standard language whose
contemporary meaning is unclear to the drafter. To be sure,
emendations may occur in other contexts as well. But there are more
error-correction mechanisms for those boilerplate terms that do have
well understood meanings and frequent usage. Subsequent drafters
that see a variation in an understood usage will be less motivated to
repeat the variation if the earlier amendments have changed this
meaning and usage in undesirable ways. Where a term has lost a shared
meaning, however, and is repeated by rote simply as part of a standard
package, these error-correcting mechanisms will not apply. This then
leads to increasing uncertainty in the meaning of the variations in the
boilerplate term.
26. See GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 10, at 73–118 (describing interviews with lawyers on
both the issuer and investor sides regarding boilerplate drafting); cf. Anna Gelpern, Mitu Gulati
& Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Why Are Sovereign Bond Contracts Sticky? A View From Government
Debt Managers 8–27 (Duke Law Sch. Working Paper 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2984293 [https://perma.cc/R8D5-8PGV] (reporting on interviews
with the debt managers and investors who hire the lawyers).
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Indeed, the very popularity of a clause as part of the standard
package of terms in a given indenture can increase even as the term
becomes more encrusted and less understood.27 This phenomenon is
propelled by information cascades. In an information cascade,
followers might imitate the variation regardless of what they think of
the merits of the choice as long as they believe there is some chance
the earlier (or even only the first) movers might have had better
information about the term’s intended meaning.28 Thus, one person’s
tinkering can become contagious even when nobody else knows what
the revision is supposed to mean.
Ironically, because of rote usage, some clauses become enshrined
on the standard checklist expected by market participants to be found
in all contracts of a particular type or in a specific market.29 These
checklists function as templates that reduce the learning costs for
potential contracting parties: a list of essential elements for every
standard deal facilitates comparisons across contract documents.
Paradoxically, however, habitual reliance on standard templates also
exacerbates the black hole problem. Once a term becomes an essential
part of a package that signals a standard set of contractual rights and
obligations, rote usage will increase, thereby accelerating loss of
meaning.30 Rather than consider the underlying substance of a
standard checklist, contracting parties may simply reproduce the terms
reflexively. In this evidentiary vacuum, the chances of a court making
an aberrant interpretation are increased as compared with a boilerplate
term with well-known meaning. The market may have overlooked the
function of a clause prior to litigation over its meaning. However, the
market will thereafter develop views on how the court’s interpretation
affects the parties’ contractual distribution of rights and obligations.

27. GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 10, at 119–38 (describing this phenomenon in the context
of the pari passu clause).
28. Lisa R. Anderson & Charles A. Holt, Information Cascades in the Laboratory, 87 AM.
ECON. REV. 847, 847–48 (1997). We are grateful to Bert Huang for alerting us to this point.
29. See GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 10, at 75–76 (quoting senior lawyers); Gelpern et al.,
supra note 26, at 11 (noting that debt managers ask lawyers to “paper the deal” by insisting that
all standard legal provisions are present). Market participants report the importance of satisfying
expectations of the “checklist” in other contexts relating to sovereign bond issuances as well; even
if the item on the list is itself meaningless. See Elisabeth de Fontenay, Josefin Meyer & Mitu
Gulati, The Sovereign Debt-Listing Puzzle 23–24 (Duke Law Sch. Working Paper 2017)
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2853917 [https://perma.cc/R3XD-JSMW]
(finding that “responses were virtually unanimous in describing the task of obtaining an exchange
listing for an international bond issuance as a ‘check-the-box’ item”).
30. See GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 10, at 75–76.
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And because a black hole had no meaning or function prior to the
interpretation, the court’s interpretation will likely upset this
distribution in unexpected and negative ways.
The standard assumption among both commercial lawyers and
legal academics is that the social costs of rote usage and encrustation
are small because the costs of judicial error will be limited to the
isolated case of an aberrant interpretation. This belief is supported by
the reasonable assumption that sophisticated commercial parties can
and are motivated to readily correct a court’s interpretive mistakes.31
Indeed, given the important role that standardization plays in
replicating boilerplate terms in tens of thousands of commercial
contracts and the nontrivial possibility that a court may err in
interpreting those terms that are infected with rote usage and/or
encrustation, commercial parties have incentives to revise their
standardized contract terms promptly to ensure that a common
meaning is preserved. Thus, the theory predicts that “harmful
heuristics, like harmful mutations in nature, will die out.”32 Leaving
inefficient interpretations of encrusted boilerplate unrevised produces
unacceptable levels of uncertainty and reduces the gains from
contracting.
But what if the assumption that markets evolve rapidly to repair
inefficient interpretations of encrusted boilerplate is incorrect? It is,
after all, an assumption based on little in the way of empirical or
theoretical work on the production process of contracts.33 Indeed, there
are well-documented circumstances where sophisticated commercial
parties fail to react promptly to inefficient judicial interpretations.
Marcel Kahan and Michael Klausner have catalogued many sources of

31. For the classic discussions of the Darwinian process that will eliminate harmful mutations
through capital structure and loan covenant contexts, see MERTON H. MILLER, Debt and Taxes,
in 1 SELECTED WORKS OF MERTON H. MILLER: A CELEBRATION OF MARKETS 103 (Bruce D.
Grundy ed., 2002) and Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting, 7 J.
FIN. ECON. 117, 123 (1979), respectively.
32. MILLER, supra note 31, at 103.
33. Scholars in contract law have largely ignored the study of how contracts are produced—
even though assumptions about contract production and revision underlie many doctrines of
contract interpretation. But see generally Robert Anderson & Jeffrey Manns, The Inefficient
Evolution of Merger Agreements, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 57 (2017) (exploring how certain
contracts are created and evolve over time); Barak Richman, Contracts Meet Henry Ford, 40
HOFSTRA L. REV. 77 (2011) (same); D. Gordon Smith & Brayden G. Smith, Contracts as
Organizations, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (2009) (same); Kevin E. Davis, Interpreting Boilerplate (NYU
Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Org., Working Paper No. 10–21, 2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1618925 [https://perma.cc/T9D2-TF9T] (same).
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inertia that can delay revisions to standardized contracts.34 But
encrusted boilerplate presents an even greater challenge to the
standard assumption: here commercial parties may face unique inertia
costs that explain why they are unable easily to convert the encrusted
boilerplate into a new and intelligible formulation. In short, boilerplate
that has devolved into a black hole may motivate inaction that lasts
well beyond the ordinary time for market adjustments.
Why might inertia costs be higher in the case of contractual black
holes? Rote usage leads to a loss of shared meaning, both between the
contracting parties and across time in the market. Over time, we
theorize, encrustations introduce essentially random variations in the
language of the boilerplate term: these variations are stripped of any
context and thus they offer no means of distinguishing legal rights and
duties among the different formulations.35 Because these random
variations are harmless for long periods of time, they persist—at least
until an adverse legal interpretation poses a systemic threat to the
market.36 As the pressure then mounts to repair the damage caused by
the black hole, parties confront a significant increase in the level of
uncertainty across all the dimensions of inertia. Individual parties are
reluctant to change the language of the disputed term because they
cannot offer a plausible alternative to the aberrant interpretation. In
addition, they are unsure how courts will respond to the changes they
do make. Until the revised term is tested in litigation, there is
uncertainty over how courts will interpret what had been an essentially
“empty” term. Individual parties also may be reluctant to draft new
contractual language in the evidentiary vacuum of a black hole because

34. For a discussion of the inertia costs that apply generally to standardized contracting, see
Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or
“The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 728 (1997).
35. We use the term “random variation” in a specific sense: the initial change in the language
of the boilerplate term was likely an intentional emendation by the agent charged with the duty
of adapting the contract to particular client needs. But the lack of the error-correction
mechanisms that exist in the case of variation of well-understood terms means that the durability
of the linguistic variation is essentially random.
36. The metaphor here is the concept of punctuated evolution as popularized by
paleontologist Stephen Jay Gould. The idea is that evolution does not select against
characteristics that are harmless. The evolutionary process is triggered only by an event that
makes the characteristic undesirable. See S.J. Gould & R.C. Lewontin, The Spandrels of San
Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm: A Critique of the Adaptationist Programme, 205 PROC.
ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON 581 passim (1979). See generally STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE STRUCTURE
OF EVOLUTIONARY THEORY (Harvard Univ. Press 2002). In the context of this paper, the pari
passu clause is not ripe for revision until holdout creditors persuade the federal district court in
New York to adopt an interpretation that blocks an agreement to restructure Argentina’s debt.
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the new clause may be used to show that the unrevised clauses in
contracts that are still outstanding mean something different from the
new clause. For example, change to the contract language that closes
off holdouts in a newly issued bond might put unrevised clauses in prior
bonds of that sovereign at greater risk of enabling holdouts. These
“legacy” costs increase as does market uncertainty: changing a term
thus poses the further risk that the standard indenture will be viewed
as idiosyncratic, thereby increasing learning costs.37
The reluctance to act in an evidentiary vacuum is greater when a
contracting party moves unilaterally while other parties continue to use
the existing boilerplate clause, even after a disfavored court
interpretation. The uncertainty over the meaning of a black hole term
coupled with the continued use of the term by others in the market
heightens the risk that subsequent courts will view a unilateral revision
of the clause as confirmation of the first court’s interpretation. In
contrast, if the market as a whole moves promptly to change the
contract language, it sends a clear signal rejecting the court’s
interpretation of the black hole clause and affirming the market’s
preference for an alternative interpretation. The black hole hypothesis
predicts that change will not occur in a significant way until market
participants, confronting a black hole term that the market historically
has disregarded, are able to solve a vexing collective action problem
and coalesce around a new industry standard. Once the collective
forms, the inertia costs for individual actors are significantly
diminished. But as we discuss below, the very uncertainty that deters
unilateral efforts to revise black hole boilerplate also increases the
coordination costs that make collective action, including the efforts of
public institutions to assist the market in clarifying the term’s meaning,
difficult to achieve.38

37. Learning costs are the costs parties must expend in learning the meaning of the clause.
The prediction from the learning cost literature is that the older and more widely used a term
becomes, the better is the common understanding of what it means. Kahan & Klausner, supra
note 34, at 719–25, 730–33. See also Goetz & Scott, supra note 5, at 286–88 (explaining how
standard terms provide benefits in terms of reducing errors of ambiguity, inconsistency, and
incompleteness); Tina L. Stark, Introduction, in NEGOTIATING AND DRAFTING CONTRACT
BOILERPLATE 3, § 1.02 (Tina L. Stark, Lauren Reiter Brody & Frances Kulka Browne eds., 2003)
(observing that provisions that have been used repeatedly develop a “hallowed status” and have
been “blessed”).
38. See GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 10, at 40–41 (suggesting moral hazard incentives that
motivate free riding by private parties on the assumption that the official sector will bear even
greater costs if the terms are not revised). For further discussion of collective action problems,
see infra Part IV.A.
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The pari passu saga that we describe below illustrates the
substantial social costs caused by aberrant interpretations of
contractual black holes. These costs include the long-term
consequences of failed efforts to restructure bonds owing to the large
number of inefficient contracts containing a now-disfavored pari passu
clause, and the cost of public efforts to overcome collective action
problems and induce change in response to the judicial error. Given
these costs, it may be misguided for contract doctrine to adhere
stubbornly to the standard interpretive command to courts to find what
the parties to the litigation meant by the black hole term. Instead,
social welfare considerations may support interpreting black hole
boilerplate terms infected by rote usage or encrustation in ways that
reduce ex ante the ex post costs of an inefficient court interpretation.39
II. A PROTOTYPICAL EXAMPLE: THE PARI PASSU CLAUSE
A. The Inquiry: Does the Market Repair Black Holes?
Our normative claim that, in some cases, courts should abandon a
search for party intent when interpreting certain boilerplate terms is
often difficult to support empirically. Consider the case where a single
court in one jurisdiction interprets a boilerplate term and, despite
public outcry, the market continues to use the same unchanged term
for years after the interpretation. Notwithstanding the public reaction,
it will be challenging to discern whether, in fact, the market views the
court as erring in its interpretation. If it is indeed the case that market
actors do not react quickly to judicial error, all that an outsider
observer sees is that the boilerplate terms in the contract have not
changed. While the absence of revision may mean that the market is
constrained in some way that impedes a prompt response to inefficient
interpretations, the absence of revision is also consistent with the
possibility that the court’s interpretation reduced hitherto
unacknowledged inefficiencies in the standard form. In that case, the
absence of a market-wide revision to the term in question would be a
confirmation of the welfare benefits of the novel interpretation.40
39. See infra Part IV (discussing the implications of boilerplate). This method of thinking
about contract interpretation techniques is articulated in Richard A. Posner, The Law and
Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1581 (2005).
40. This argument has been advanced in the case of the pari passu controversy by Marcel
Kahan & Shmuel Leshem, Moral Hazard and Sovereign Debt: The Role of Contractual
Ambiguity and Asymmetric Information (2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal) and by Mark L. J. Wright, The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Bond Contracts:
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What evidence would be sufficient to support the claim that the
market is peculiarly disabled from promptly revising or deleting a
contractual black hole following an erroneous interpretation? Ideally,
one would hope to see multiple courts across different jurisdictions
interpreting an encrusted boilerplate term in a particular way, followed
by numerous contracts written with the same unrevised term. To be
sure, there are many sources of inertia that delay revisions to
standardized contracts,41 but inaction that lasts well beyond the typical
time for market adjustments42 justifies the inference that either
contractual black holes are associated with extraordinary inertia costs43
or the market is endorsing the prevalent court interpretation.
But how can one then distinguish between these two plausible
reasons for the lack of a market response? Suppose after an extended
delay we do observe an eventual and wholesale revision in the language
of the boilerplate that explicitly rejects the courts’ interpretation of the
meaning of the black hole term. With multiple instances of judicial
interpretation, particularly if the courts are taken as authoritative,
researchers can more credibly dismiss the explanation that the
interpretation from an aberrant court does not reflect the prevailing
judicial view. And when the eventual changes to the clause expressly
Evolution or Intelligent Design?, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 103 (2011). In another article, we test the
“Rational Design” hypothesis and find little or no support for the claim that the failure to respond
to the courts’ interpretation was a rational attempt to reduce moral hazard costs by precluding a
subsequent restructuring. Choi et al., supra note 15, at 28–34.
41. See, e.g., GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 10, at 33–44 (providing an overview of the theories
explaining the prevalence of contract boilerplate).
42. For a contrasting example of sovereign boilerplate that has been revised much more
rapidly when impacted by the same external events, see generally Choi et al., supra note 15.
43. If in fact inertia costs peculiar to black holes do contribute to the extraordinary delay,
then an inefficient interpretation of such a clause will impose additional social costs on the market
as parties continue to write contracts that fail to maximize the joint gains from contracting. In the
case of the pari passu clause, the extraordinary inertia costs cited by market players as
explanations for inaction can be grouped in four distinct categories: (1) Legacy Debt Costs: A
change to the contract language that closes off holdouts in cases involving a newly issued bond
might put the unrevised clauses in prior bonds of that sovereigns at greater risk of enabling
holdouts, if the court draws a negative inference about the meaning of the old clauses from the
fact that there was a substantial change in the new issues. (2) Market Reaction Uncertainty: There
will be uncertainty as to how investors will react to a new formulation of a commonly used clause,
especially where the clause lacks a well-understood meaning in the market. (3) Idiosyncrasy
Costs: Investors have a preference for the “standard” package of terms. Changing a term poses
the risk that the bond will be viewed as idiosyncratic, thus increasing learning costs. (4) Legal
Uncertainty: How courts will interpret the new term remains an uncertainty until the term is
tested in litigation: the uncertainty is greater if the lack of a settled market understanding means
that courts must interpret the clause in an an evidentiary vacuum. For a discussion of these
concepts, see GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 10, at 73–108.
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reject the prevailing judicial interpretation, researchers can dismiss the
explanation that the market had endorsed the efficiency of the newly
minted boilerplate. The foregoing conditions are, unsurprisingly
perhaps, hard to find. However, the decade-long litigation between
NML Capital, the hedge fund of the U.S. billionaire, Paul Singer, and
the Republic of Argentina, has provided a natural experimental setting
that allows us to test the market response to court decisions
interpreting a boilerplate term: Is the delay in the market’s response
more consistent with a rational meaning for the term or with a
contractual black hole that impedes the ability of the market to react
to a disfavored court interpretation?44
B. The History of Pari Passu Litigation45
To understand why an examination of the history of the pari passu
clause offers a valuable natural experiment, one needs to return to
litigation that occurred in 2000 involving NML’s predecessor, Elliott
Associates, another hedge fund run by Mr. Singer. In that instance,
Singer’s fund was pursuing the Republic of Peru on debt claims his
fund had purchased at a deep discount.46 Obtaining a judgment against
Peru for nonpayment of the debt was straightforward, as there was no
dispute that Peru had not paid. Enforcement of the judgment proved
much more difficult, as it always is with sovereign debtors, which is why
defaulted sovereign debt trades at a deep discount on the secondary
market. Elliott Associates had purchased discounted debt and sought
to use its legal expertise, along with its unusually deep pockets, to
recover in full from recalcitrant debtors so as to make a profit worthy
of a hedge fund. As part of that endeavor, Elliott was chasing Peruvian
assets in a variety of jurisdictions around the world, including Brussels.
There, Elliott struck pay dirt: The commercial court in Brussels ruled,
on an ex parte motion, that the version of the pari passu clause used in
the Peruvian debt contracts47 meant that Peru could not pay any other
44. We take the standard sovereign bond contract that includes the ubiquitous pari passu
clause to be prototypical, not representative, of boilerplate contracts of its type: Its elements are
not those most frequently to be found in an empirical survey of standard form contracts with some
encrusted terms. Rather, the standard contract contains the essential features that, in repeating
boilerplate terms untested by litigation over long periods, define the category. In this sense, the
sovereign bond contract is a prototype or central exemplar of a distinct class of contracts, in the
way that robins and swallows are prototypes of birds, while chickens, ostriches and penguins,
despite their many similarities to robins and swallows, are not.
45. The following Part draws from GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 10.
46. This part draws on GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 10, at 12–17.
47. For a discussion of the pari passu variation used in the Peruvian debt contracts, see infra
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creditors without paying Elliott a pro rata share.48 Further, the judge
ruled that Elliott was entitled to an injunction against Euroclear, the
Brussels-based financial clearinghouse, which would bar payments to
the holders of restructured bonds (who were being paid in full on their
restructured amounts) unless Elliott got its full payment on its
unrestructured amount.49
The international financial community reacted with alarm. The
luminaries in the field uniformly condemned the decision as
inconsistent with long-held market understandings of the meaning of
pari passu. Whatever the clause meant, and no one was certain of its
contemporary meaning, the experts asserted that everyone knew that
it did not mean that all creditors must be paid pro rata, despite a
restructuring agreement giving preference to consenting creditors.50
But notwithstanding the dismay expressed in dozens of academic and
policy articles,51 and even after a proposal for a new international
bankruptcy court for sovereign debtors led by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF),52 for over a decade virtually no pari passu
provisions in sovereign debt contracts were modified to clarify this

note 93 and accompanying text. The English translation of pari passu is “in equal step.” The clause
has been present in sovereign debt instruments since at least the early nineteenth century. See
Benjamin Chabot & Mitu Gulati, Santa Anna and His Black Eagle: The Origins of Pari Passu?, 9
CAP. MKTS. L.J. 216, 216–17 (2014); see also Pablo Triana, The First Foreign Sovereign Pari
Passu?
It’s
All
Scottish
to
Me
(2015)
(unpublished
manuscript),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=2662851
[https://perma.cc/ZP8L-SQWP]
(describing a similar clause drafted in the 1800s).
48. See supra note 11.
49. For discussions of the Brussels case and its aftermath, see, e.g., Robert A. Cohen,
“Sometimes a Cigar is Just a Cigar”: The Simple Story of Pari Passu, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11, 15–
17 (2011) and Manuel Monteaguodo, Peru’s Experience in Sovereign Debt Management and
Litigation: Some Lessons for The Legal Approach to Sovereign Indebtedness, 73 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 201, 208–10 (2010).
50. E.g., Lee C. Buchheit & Jeremiah S. Pam, The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt
Instruments, 53 EMORY L.J. 869, 876 (2004); Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, To Rank Pari Passu or
Not to Rank Pari Passu: That is the Question in Sovereign Bonds after the Latest Episode of the
Argentine Saga, 15 LAW & BUS. REV. AMS., 745, 769 (2009); Charles G. Berry, “Pari Passu”
Means What Now? N.Y.L.J., Mar. 6, 2006, at 1.
51. See, e.g., Patrick Wautelet, Vulture Funds, Sovereign Debtors and Creditors, in
INSOLVABILITE DES ETATS ET DETTES SOUVARINES 103, 142 (Matthias Audit ed., 2011) (“While
it was unanimously decried by commentators, who expressed surprise at the interpretation
accepted by the Court of Appeal, the decision of the Court of Appeal was seen as a blessing by
the community of sovereign debt creditors which had until then not paid much attention to the
pari passu clause.” (footnote omitted) (emphasis omitted)).
52. See Anne Krueger, First Deputy Managing Director, Int’l Monetary Fund, A New
Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring (Nov. 26, 2001), http://www-personal.umich.edu/
~kathrynd/IMFDebtRestructuring.Krueger.pdf [https://perma.cc/H78S-BUUB].
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understanding.53 The same version of the pari passu clause that had led
to the supposedly unsupportable decision in Brussels was used over
and over again for a decade in literally hundreds of contracts.54
What explains this disjunction? The same law firms whose senior
lawyers were declaiming the clear error of the Brussels interpretation
were simultaneously continuing to use the same problematic version of
the clause in their own sovereign clients’ documents.55 To understand
why this “patent judicial error” was uncorrected in subsequent
contracts, two of us conducted nearly a hundred interviews with
leading sovereign debt lawyers in New York, London, Paris, and
Frankfurt.56 Their answers varied, but the typical response was: “Why
should we change the clause? No court in New York or London would
ever make such an error. This was an aberrant decision from an
obscure court in Brussels.” Moreover, the debt lawyers argued, this was
an ex parte decision57: If Peru’s lawyers had been given an opportunity
to argue their position, the case would never have come down that
way.58
Ten years later, in December 2011, a federal district court in New
York shattered the assumptions of the sovereign debt lawyers who had
heaped contempt on the Brussels court. This time, the hedge fund was
NML Capital, holding defaulted debt owed by the Republic of
Argentina. NML requested an injunction from a federal judge in New
York based on a claimed violation of essentially that same version of

53. See GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 10, at 53–119 (reporting both on data and interviews
with lawyers).
54. Id. at ch. 5.
55. Other scholars were also puzzled by the bond lawyers’ failure to correct in their contracts
what they were asserting was a grievous error in court interpretation. See Stephen Nelson, Market
Rules: Social Conventions, Legal Fictions and the Organization of Sovereign Debt Markets in the
Long Twentieth Century, in CONTRACTUAL KNOWLEDGE: ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF LEGAL
EXPERIMENTATION IN GLOBAL MARKETS 118, 141–43 (Grégoire Mallard & Jérôme Sgard eds.,
2016); Leland Goss, NML v. Argentina: the Borrower, the Banker and the Lawyer: Contract
Reform at a Snail’s Pace, 9 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 287, 288–90 (2014); Umakanth Varottil, Sovereign
Debt Documentation: Unraveling the Pari Passu Mystery, 7 DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J. 119, 122–
25 (2008).
56. GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 10, at chs. 6–8.
57. The context was a request for injunctive relief. See id. at ch. 1.
58. Peru’s lawyers in the case were from the firm Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton,
probably the leading sovereign side law firm in the world. See id. at ch. 1; see also Michael Bradley,
Irving De Lira Salvatierra & Mitu Gulati, Lawyers: Gatekeepers of the Sovereign Debt Market?,
38 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 150, 162 (2014) (describing the market for lawyers in the sovereign
debt context, and the key players there).
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the pari passu clause.59 And this time the litigation was not ex parte, as
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton, the law firm on the sovereign side,
had ample opportunity to make its arguments in full. Moreover, the
judge had handled major sovereign debt disputes before60 and had
access to a decade’s worth of academic research studying the impact of
the Elliott v. Peru cases.61 Nevertheless, after hearing extensive
argument from both sides, the court held that this version of the pari
passu clause required a pro rata payment to all creditors, including
holdouts, in essentially the same way as had the Brussels court.62
The financial community again expressed profound dismay at the
court’s interpretation of the pari passu boilerplate language.63 The
almost universal assumption of the sovereign debt community of
lawyers, academics, and government officials was that the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit—traditionally, the
preeminent court in the country on business law matters—would
overrule the district court and repudiate the pro rata sharing
interpretation of pari passu. Numerous amicus briefs were filed,
including briefs by the U.S. Department of Justice,64 the Clearing

59. GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 10, at 170–75. This version of the pari passu clause is
reproduced infra note 87 and accompanying text.
60. See Allied Bank Int’l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 522–23 (2d
Cir. 1985). For a discussion of the case, see FEDERICO STURZENEGGER & JEROMIN
ZETTELMEYER, DEBT DEFAULTS AND LESSONS FROM A DECADE OF CRISIS 64–66 (2006).
61. Judge Griesa’s attempts to manage the aftermath of the Argentine default and the
various litigations is discussed in Marcus Miller & Dania Thomas, Sovereign Debt Restructuring:
Judge Griesa, the Vultures and Creditor Rights, 30 WORLD ECON. 1491 (2007).
62. Order, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 08 Civ. 6978(TPG), 09 Civ.
1707(TPG), 09 Civ. 1708(TPG) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2011), 2011 WL 9522565, at *2. As in Brussels,
the judge granted an injunction. This order applied to the institutions that might have otherwise
helped Argentina pay the non-holdout creditors–they were at risk of being in contempt of court
if they aided or abetted the debtor. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 1:08-cv06978, 1:08-cv-01707, 1:08-cv-01708 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2012).
63. Some even intimated that the judge’s advancing age (he was an octogenarian) may have
played a role in his decision. To get a flavor of some of the critiques, see, e.g., Floyd Norris, The
Muddled Case of Argentine Bonds, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/
2014/07/25/business/rulings-add-to-the-mess-in-argentine-bonds.html
[https://perma.cc/7V7B7YV7] and Linette Lopez, Check Out This Crazy Argentine Propaganda Poster With an American
Judge’s Head on a Vulture’s Body, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 13, 2014, 5:35 PM), http://
www.businessinsider.com/argentina-judge-griesa-propaganda-poster-2014-8 [https://perma.cc/
VT7L-X5M6]. See also Theresa Monteleone, A Vulture’s Gamble: High-Stakes Interpretation of
Sovereign Debt Contracts in NML Capital, Ltd v. Republic of Argentina, 8 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 149,
160–65 (2013); Tim Samples, Rogue Trends in Sovereign Debt: Argentina, Vulture Funds, and Pari
Passu Under New York Law, 35 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 49, 81–85 (2014); W.M.C. Weidemaier,
Sovereign Debt After NML v. Argentina, 8 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 123, 130–31 (2013).
64. Brief for the United States of America as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellee, NML
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House Association,65 and the American Bankers Association,66 most of
which excoriated the trial court’s interpretation of pari passu.
Yet, in October of 2012, the Second Circuit’s three-judge panel
unanimously affirmed the trial judge’s interpretation of Argentina’s
pari passu clause.67 Again there were expressions of surprise and alarm
by market insiders and more briefs filed, including by a Nobel laureate
expert in sovereign debt, and three separate countries (adding their
voices to that of the United States in the lower court),68 asking the U.S.
Supreme Court to take the case and repair the damage the pro rata
interpretation of pari passu was inflicting on the market for sovereign
bonds. Nevertheless, in June 2014, the Supreme Court declined to hear
the case, seeing no substantial reason to disturb the decision of the
lower court.69
In April 2013, as a result of the failure to get relief in the courts
and because the market seemed unable or unwilling to fix the pari
passu problem on its own, an effort to solve the problem began at the
Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 2013). A leading New York law firm,
Shearman & Sterling LLP, has usefully consolidated and organized all of the key filings in the
NML v. Argentina case. See Argentine Sovereign Debt, SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, http://
argentine.shearman.com [https://perma.cc/P3ZK-MAZU].
65. Brief for the Clearing House Association as Amici Curiae Supporting Non-Party, NML
Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 2013); Brief for the Clearing House
Association as Amici Curiae Supporting Reversal, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina,
727 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 2013).
66. Brief for the American Bankers Association as Amici Curiae Supporting Non-Party,
NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 2013).
67. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 250–51 (2d Cir. 2012).
68. The amici were Anne Krueger and Joseph Stiglitz, respectively. Brief for Joseph Stiglitz
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct.
2819 (2014) (mem.) (No. 13-990). The countries filing briefs at the U.S. Supreme Court, in
opposition to the lower court’s pari passu ruling were Brazil, France, Mexico, and the United
States. Brief for the Federative Republic of Brazil as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014) (No. 13-990); Brief for the
Republic of France as Amicus Curiae Supporting the Republic of Argentina’s Petition for a Writ
of Certiorari, Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014) (No. 13-990);
Brief for the United Mexican States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitions for Writs of
Certiorari, Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014) (No. 13-990); Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Republic of Argentina v. NML
Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2250 (2014) (No. 12-842).
69. See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S.Ct. 2819, 2819 (2014) (mem.). Not
only did the Supreme Court decline to reinterpret pari passu, but in a related dispute over the
scope of discovery allowed NML, the Court ruled in a fashion that facilitated NML’s efforts to
pursue its litigation overseas. Karen Halverson Cross, U.S. Supreme Court Denies Certiorari and
Affirms Discovery in Bondholder Litigation Against Argentina, AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW:
INSIGHTS (Oct. 15, 2014), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/18/issue/23/us-supreme-courtdenies-certiorari-and-affirms-discovery-bondholder [https://perma.cc/SBX2-GNN8].
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Spring IMF/World Bank Meetings.70 The primary conveners were the
U.S. Treasury Department and the IMF, with the support of the French
Finance Ministry’s Paris Club, the International Capital Market
Association (ICMA), the Bank of England, and representatives from
major ministries of finance and industry groups around the world.71
This group of experts met again at the Fall IMF/World Bank meetings
in October 2013.72 In December 2013, after extensive discussions with
the foregoing committee of experts, ICMA, the leading industry group,
issued new proposed versions of the pari passu clause in draft form.73
The IMF, which had been actively involved in the ICMA process,
followed a few months later with an extensive report recommending
that sovereign issuers revise their pari passu clauses.74 Finally, in
September 2015, after their meeting in Ankara, the G-20 Finance
Ministers and Central Bank Governors included an endorsement of
these reform efforts on the part of the IMF in their communique.75
As of early 2017, the IMF’s latest report on revisions to pari passu
reveals that a majority of pure sovereign issuers have now clarified or
modified outright their pari passu clauses.76 What the foregoing
provides, now that widespread modifications have appeared, is the
opportunity to unpack the mechanics of the process by which
boilerplate terms are revised. By using a combination of the data on

70. For a description of the “back story” from a senior official at the U.S. Treasury, see Mark
Sobel, Strengthening Collective Action Clauses: Catalyzing Change–The Back Story, 11 CAP.
MKTS. L.J. 3, 6–9 (2016).
71. Id.
72. Id. For additional detail on the reform efforts, see Goss, supra note 55, at 287–97 and
Anna Gelpern, Brad Setser & Ben Heller, Count the Limbs: Designing Robust Aggregation
Clauses in Sovereign Bonds, in TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE: THE QUEST TO RESOLVE SOVEREIGN
DEBT CRISES 109 (Martin Guzman, Jose Ocampo & Joseph Stiglitz eds. 2016).
73. Goss, supra note 55, at 289. The final version of the proposed ICMA clauses was issued
roughly six months later in June 2014.
74. For a description of the IMF’s actions, see Nikita Agarwal & Chanda De Long,
Strengthening the Contractual Framework for Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 11 CAP. MKTS. L.J.
25, 26–27 (2016). See also Elaine Moore, IMF Recommends Overhaul of Sovereign Bonds, FIN.
TIMES (Oct. 6, 2014), https://www.ft.com/content/368be778-4d41-11e4-8f75-00144feab7de
[https://perma.cc/U2YY-EW7P] (detailing reforms proposed by the IMF).
75. See generally G20 FINANCE MINISTERS AND CENTRAL BANK GOVERNORS,
COMMUNIQUÉ FOR THE G20 SUMMIT IN ANKARA, TURKEY 6 (2015), http://
www.g20.utoronto.ca/2015/150905-finance.pdf [https://perma.cc/9QBJ-UJB8] (“We call on the
IMF, in consultation with other relevant parties, to continue to promote and monitor the progress
on the implementation of the strengthened collective action and pari passu clauses . . . .”).
76. According to the Report, over 60 percent of new issues under both English and New
York law have amended their pari passu clauses in the post-October 2014 period. See Agarwal &
De Long, supra note 74, at 26.
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the changing language of pari passu and interviews with market
participants involved in the revision process, one can begin to answer
the questions how and when contractual black holes, infected both with
rote usage and encrustation, are remedied by revisions to contract
language. In the ten years between the Brussels decision in September
2000 and the New York decision in December 2011, virtually no
sovereign issuer amended its pari passu clause to explicitly foreclose
the interpretation in Elliott v. Peru.77 But as of the IMF’s report from
mid-2015, the data show an extensive movement—albeit among only
one distinctive subset of sovereign issuers—to reject explicitly the
ratable payment interpretation advanced by the Brussels and New
York courts.78 In the following Part, we examine the dynamics—and
associated costs—of the revision process.
Understanding those dynamics is critical to answering the initial
question: How accurate is the assumption that sophisticated
commercial actors will overcome inertia costs and reject a judicial
interpretation of a black hole in a standard form boilerplate contract
that regulates a major industry? The empirical study described below
suggests that the standard assumption is false, at least in the context of
one specific multi-trillion-dollar market. Changing a boilerplate term
whose meaning has largely been forgotten and that has developed
numerous encrustations can take years, and the process can prove
enormously costly, particularly in terms of the hundreds of billions of
dollars’ worth of bonds issued with suboptimal terms in the interim
period.79 Those costs support the claim advanced in Part IV that a
77. See GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 10, at 26.
78. See INT’L MONETARY FUND, PROGRESS REPORT ON THE INCLUSION OF ENHANCED
CONTRACTUAL PROTECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL SOVEREIGN BOND CONTRACTS 8 (2015),
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2015/091715.pdf [https://perma.cc/XS4W-XFTC]. For an
illustration of the reduction in sovereigns employing pari passu clauses that ranked payments
equally, see infra fig.5.
79. The overwhelming sentiment (as publicly articulated in the press, and what we have
heard in interviews for this project) is that the interpretation of pari passu by the courts in Brussels
and New York reduced the efficiency of the sovereign bond market. Nevertheless, there is the
counterargument that observed variations in pari passu are a rational precommitment by debtors
with different risk profiles to either foreclose or invite the possibility of a future restructuring
attempt. See, e.g., Kahan & Leshem, supra note 40, at 15–17; Wright, supra note 40, 112–14. In a
companion empirical paper, we test the “Rational Design” hypothesis and find it wanting. See
Choi et al., supra note 15, at 32–33. That evidence is also consistent with the view of this case in
the financial press:
So the people who thought the holdouts’ pari passu theory was crazy seem to be
right. The world seems to be unambiguously worse off than it would be if the U.S.
courts had rejected the theory. Argentina is worse off (it’s in a default crisis), the
exchange bondholders are worse off (their interest payments have stopped), and the
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search for party intent is both futile and counterproductive when
boilerplate with these characteristics is included in industry contracts.
III. THE POST-LITIGATION DATA
A. Data Sources and Coding
To unpack the boilerplate revision process, we assembled a
dataset of all of the available sovereign and quasi-sovereign bonds for
the five-year period between June 1, 2011 and May 30, 2016. As
sources, we used Thomson One Banker and Perfect Information, the
two primary public data sources of offering circulars and prospectuses
for debt offerings. For data on prices and maturities, we supplemented
the foregoing with information from DCM Analytics. The datasets
provide documentation on what the industry designates as “managed
deals,” where bankers and lawyers are involved in preparing the
contract documentation, setting the initial prices, and finding the initial
customers. The strongest AAA issuers, the United States, United
Kingdom, Netherlands, Japan, Germany and France, are not included:
owing to their strong credit, they do not use traditional contracts with
pari passu clauses to sell their bonds.80
The foregoing cut of the available sovereign bond data produced
a set of 1583 bonds from 90 different issuers. The bond issuances were
governed either under local law or a dozen different governing foreign
law regimes. For each of these bonds, we coded two basic bond
characteristics.81 These were (1) the type of issuer divided into two sub

holdout bondholders are no better off, since it’s not like they’re getting paid anything
either.
More generally, it’s crazy because it makes sovereign debt restructuring impossible.
If you know your choice is to take 30 cents on the dollar or to take zero, you’ll probably
take 30. But if you know that if everyone else takes 30, you can still sue for full
repayment, then you’ll have no incentive to negotiate. The courts’ reading of the pari
passu clause means that those holdout bonds can never be compromised; every single
holder of those bonds can demand full payment. This is a problem that Argentina
currently faces: Even if the holdout bondholders who sued Argentina do want to reach
a settlement for less than 100 cents on the dollar, they have no way of binding other
holdout bondholders.
Matt Levine, How Should Future Argentinas Treat Future Vultures?, BLOOMBERG: VIEW (Aug.
29, 2014, 5:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2014-08-29/how-should-futureargentinas-treat-future-vultures [https://perma.cc/3RTM-9L3G].
80. Also outside the dataset are bonds that might be issued in some non-AAA countries to
purely domestic investors, usually, captive domestic banks, in which bankers, lawyers, and
contracts are not involved.
81. In a companion paper, with an econometric analysis, we code for additional variables
such as the bond ratings and offering amounts. See Choi et al., supra note 15, at 25.
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categories—pure sovereign bonds issued by nations, and quasisovereign issuances, such as sovereign guarantees, sub-sovereign bonds
of cities, states and provinces and supranationals,82 all of whom have a
degree of sovereign immunity and, most importantly, are either not
subject to a bankruptcy regime or where the applicability of
bankruptcy is unclear;83 and (2) the governing law variable as either
local law—the sovereign’s contracts are governed by its own law—or
some foreign law that the sovereign cannot change at its discretion,
typically English or New York law.
We turn next to focus on the primary questions of whether and
how the pari passu clauses changed in the wake of the NML v.
Argentina decisions by the New York courts during the 2011–2013
period. Here, changes to the pari passu provisions were coded in terms
of two different types observed in the data (a) major changes to the
core language of the pari passu clause and (b) minor changes at the
margins that might, for example, expand or contract the scope of the
clause’s applicability or augment the available evidence on the
meaning of the term.
B. Major Changes to the Core Language of Pari Passu
First, we considered whether the clause changed in the direction
of either the pro or antiratable payments interpretation. Our
hypothesis was that the market would either delete the pari passu
clause or revise it to reduce the risk of another court adopting the
ratable payments interpretation. The baseline for each bond was the
version of the clause that the relevant issuer was using before June
2011. From that baseline, we examined whether and what changes were
made to the boilerplate language subsequently.
The typical and oldest version of the pari passu clause, a clause
found in almost every sovereign or quasi-sovereign bond contract,
states in essence:
The notes rank and will rank without any preference among
themselves and pari passu with all other unsubordinated public
external indebtedness of the Republic.

82. Supranationals include entities such as the Asian and African Development Banks.
83. This latter aspect is important because the supposedly damaging impact of the ratable
payments interpretation is most relevant in the context where there is no bankruptcy court to
oversee a restructuring and, if necessary, force a resolution. We only coded these bonds if they
used pari passu clauses in the period prior to December 2011 (because our interest is whether and
how the clauses changed in these bonds in response to the case).
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We refer to this version of the clause as the “Rank” clause. Prior
to the pari passu litigation, eminent practitioners in the field were
openly puzzled as to why this boilerplate clause was used in a sovereign
debt instrument.84 The concept of Rank has a clear meaning in a
domestic bankruptcy context, where a judge supervises the division of
the debtor’s limited assets among creditors of different rank.85 All
those creditors who are of equal or pari passu rank share equally once
the creditors senior to them have been paid. But sovereigns do not and
cannot enter a judge-supervised bankruptcy procedure. There is no
procedure by which an insolvent sovereign’s assets—primarily, its
ability to impose taxes on its citizens—get divided. The clause, these
expert sovereign debt lawyers were saying, was meaningless
boilerplate, a holdover from a distant era when its inclusion in these
sovereign instruments might have made more sense.86 From the
viewpoint of the contemporary market participants, the pari passu
clause in sovereign debt instruments was precisely the kind of
contractual black hole that had lost meaning over the years as a result
of encrustation and rote usage.
Over the roughly 200 years that the clause appeared in debt
instruments—steadily increasing in popularity, even as contemporary
understanding diminished—encrustations began to emerge as words
and phrases were added and subtracted. These variations produced
several distinct linguistic departures from the original “Rank” version
of the pari passu clause. For example, in 2010, immediately prior to the
sample period, Italy adopted a sui generis pari passu clause in its New
York law bonds providing that:
[t]he Securities are the . . . unsecured obligations of Italy and will rank
equally with all other . . . unsecured and unsubordinated general
obligations of Italy for money borrowed . . . . Amounts payable in
respect of principal of (and interest on) the Securities will be charged
upon and be payable out of the [Treasury of Italy], equally and ratably
with all other amounts so charged and amounts payable in respect of

84. GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 10, at ch. 4.
85. See Mitu Gulati & Kenneth Klee, Sovereign Piracy, 56 BUS. LAW. 635, 639–40 & 639 n.26
(2001).
86. In prior work, we suggested a story for why the clause might have made sense in the era
of gunboat diplomacy in the 1800s. With the gunboats, after all, the foreign creditors could take
over the debtor’s ports, where the tax revenues were collected, and, in effect, liquidate the assets.
But almost no one among the parties to the current transactions seemed aware of that earlier
interpretation nor, more importantly, seemed to care. GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 10, at chs. 8–
9.
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all other general loan obligations of Italy.

We term this version of the clause, that provides for explicit
ratable payments, the “Pay Equally and Ratably” pari passu clause.
The Pay Equally and Ratably clause poses a high risk of holdouts as it
appears to promise that all creditors be paid ratably whether or not
they have consented to a restructuring.
Sometime in the 1980s, other bonds began to promise investors yet
a third version:
The bonds rank, and will rank, pari passu in right of payment with all
of the Issuer’s present and future unsubordinated External
Indebtedness.87

We term this version the “Rank Equally in Payment” pari passu
clause. This was the version of the clause Singer’s hedge fund seized
upon, first in Brussels and later in New York. Singer’s fund found a
New York University law professor who opined that he understood the
meaning of the clause. A sovereign debtor who was in arrears to
creditors, Professor Andreas Lowenfeld explained, had to pay the
creditors who ranked pari passu in right of payment on a pro rata
basis.88 And importantly, given that a court’s order to pay is largely
meaningless against a sovereign debtor, Lowenfeld explained that the
clause was an intercreditor agreement that entitled a creditor who was
not paid his pro rata share to an injunction against other creditors who
were paid that share.89 In the context of a debt restructuring, where
some creditors have agreed to take a haircut on their bonds and others
are holding out and not receiving any payment, an injunction against
another creditor is a powerful remedy for the holdouts. That was
precisely what the creditors in Brussels and in New York asked for and
obtained.
For coding purposes, it is important to recognize that the version
of the pari passu clause at issue in both the Argentine and Peruvian
litigations was particularly vulnerable to Lowenfeld’s pro rata or
ratable payment interpretation: the word “payment” was used to
modify the promise on the part of the issuer that the bonds would “rank
87. See Lee C. Buchheit & Sofia D. Martos, What To Do About Pari Passu?, 8
BUTTERWORTHS J. INT’L BANKING & FIN. L. 491, 491 (2014) (emphasis added) (emphasis
omitted). The evolution of the different formulations of the clause is described in Mark
Weidemaier, Robert E. Scott & Mitu Gulati, Origin Myths, Contracts, and the Hunt for Pari Passu,
38 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 72 (2013).
88. See Buchheit & Pam, supra note 50, at 878 (describing Lowenfeld’s argument).
89. Id.
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equally.” The clauses at issue in both litigations went beyond the
standard “rank equally” language to include the promise that “the
bonds rank, and will rank, pari passu in right of payment.”
We rated the vulnerability of the different clauses based on the
risk of successful litigation by holdout creditors on a scale of high risk
to zero risk, with high risk being maximal vulnerability (where the
contract language said explicitly that each creditor was entitled to
equal ratable payments); to medium risk (the type of clause that used
the word “payment” to modify “rank”); to low risk (which only
articulated the concept of ranking).90
Finally, we coded a category of bonds in a subset of clauses
primarily governed by English law as having a near zero risk. In these
bonds, the standard pari passu language gets supplemented by words
such as “except as subject to provisions of mandatory law.”91 On its
face, this additional language appears to say that the effect of the basic
clause can be negated by the passage of a local law. In other words, the
debtor has the power to render the clause meaningless as a creditor
weapon. We term this version of the pari passu clause the “Mandatory
Law” variation. Table I summarizes the different types of pari passu
clauses found in the data set in 2011 and the risk of holdouts from a
debt restructuring that each posed prior to the Southern District of
New York trial court opinion (“SDNY opinion”).92

90. In our empirical tests of pricing effects for a companion article, we code these on a scale
of 10, 5, 1, and 0, which roughly corresponds to the relative risk levels.
91. See Weidemaier et al., supra note 87, at 88 fig.2 and accompanying text (illustrating the
increase in similar “mandatory law” phrases in English-law bonds). This provision has come to
light in the context of Ukraine’s recently concluded restructuring exercise. See Joseph Cotterill,
Ukraine’s Bonds: A Little Local Leverage?, FIN. TIMES: ALPHAVILLE (Mar. 26, 2015),
http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2015/03/26/2122586/ukraines-bonds-a-little-local-leverage
[https://perma.cc/AT32-P9HS] (providing examples of different sovereigns including similar
provisions in their bonds).
92. For discussions of the evolution of these different clauses and their risk levels, see
Buchheit & Martos, supra note 87, at 491–93 and Weidemaier et al., supra note 87, at 84–90 figs.1,
2 & 3. We had also envisioned coding some bonds as zero risk, where the pari passu clause had
been deleted altogether, but no such observations appear in the data.
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Table I: Types of Pari Passu Clause
Pari Passu Clause

Risk Level

Pay Equally and Ratably

High

Rank Equally in Payment

Medium

Rank

Low

Mandatory Law

Zero

C. Minor Revisions: Modifications That Might Influence
Interpretation or Scope
Initially, we assumed that if parties disagreed with a court’s
interpretation of a boilerplate clause in a standard form contract, even
accounting for ordinary friction costs, they ultimately would adopt
what we have called a “major change”: either delete the term or revise
its core language to reject the now-disfavored meaning. Instead, we
found in the data a number of unanticipated minor changes.
1. The Evidentiary Patch. The most common minor modification
reflected in the data was the introduction of an evidentiary patch—a
supplementary sentence in the offering prospectus explaining what the
clause did not mean.93 As a matter of contract doctrine, such a
modification made outside the core language of the relevant contract
provision is less effective than a major change to the contract language
itself.94 A court will focus first on the language of the clause in the
93. See, e.g., REPUBLIC OF HOND., OFFERING CIRCULAR, 7.50% NOTES DUE 2024, at 8
(2013), http://www.sefin.gob.hn/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/ofering_circular.pdf [https://perma.
cc/EER8-4356] (“To ensure clarity on the point, Honduras intends to take the position that the
pari passu clause in the terms and conditions of the Notes does not obligate it to pay Public
External Indebtedness on a ratable basis.”).
94. For a classic case where arguments bearing on how a bond contract provision should be
interpreted were made on the basis of risk disclosures in the prospectus and other public
statements by company officials, see Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504,
1514–15 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“In interpreting these contracts, this Court must be concerned with
what the parties intended, but only to the extent that what they intended is evidenced by what is
written in the indentures.” (emphasis added)).

CHOI GULATI SCOTT IN PRINTER FINAL_KK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

30

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

9/25/2017 2:10 PM

[Vol. 67:1

contract: even if there is elsewhere in the offering documents a
disavowal of one particular meaning, the risk of misinterpretation
remains. In an analogous evidentiary patch, some bonds in the
database include a further supplementary explanation regarding risk,
referred to as a “risk factor” disclosure. Here, issuers report in the risk
disclosure section of the offering prospectus that the pari passu clause
in the contract poses a risk of an adverse interpretation for investors.95
These evidentiary patches and risk factor disclosures may not
measurably effect the interpretation of boilerplate terms when there is
a large body of available evidence on the term’s meaning. Issuers,
however, may believe that these additions will have more influence on
a court’s interpretation of a contractual black hole where there is an
evidentiary vacuum.
2. Scope of the Clause. Our final coding concerns the scope of the
clause. Pari passu clauses vary in terms of the breadth of the promise
they make. Most pari passu provisions in international bonds promise
the bonds will rank pari passu with some portion of the sovereign’s
other unsecured and unsubordinated obligations.96 The size of that
portion ranges from the sovereign’s “external indebtedness,” which is
usually defined as the indebtedness of the sovereign that is
denominated in a foreign currency to “all unsecured and
unsubordinated obligations,” which is sufficiently broad to include the

95. The operative language from Paraguay’s Offering Circular from January 2013 says:
In ongoing litigation in federal courts in New York captioned NML Capital, Ltd. v.
Republic of Argentina, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has ruled that
the ranking clause in bonds issued by Argentina prevents Argentina from making
payments in respect of the bonds unless it makes pro rata payments in respect of
defaulted debt that ranks pari passu with the performing bonds. The judgment has been
appealed.
We cannot predict when or in what form a final appellate decision will be granted.
Depending on the scope of the final decision, a final decision that requires ratable
payments could potentially hinder or impede future sovereign debt restructurings and
distressed debt management . . . . Paraguay cannot predict whether or in what manner
the courts will resolve this dispute or how any such judgment will be applied or
implemented.
REPUBLIC OF PARA., OFFERING CIRCULAR, 4.625% BONDS DUE 2023, at 17 (2013),
https://ftalphaville-cdn.ft.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Paraguay-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3GQM-LZ2A].
96. For a description of these variations, see Lee C. Buchheit & Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt
Restructuring After NML v Argentina, 12 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 224, 238 app. (2017) and Rodrigo
Olivares-Caminal, The Definition of Indebtedness and the Consequent Imperiling of the Pari
Passu, Negative Pledge and Cross-Default Clauses in Sovereign Debt Instruments, 12 CAP. MKTS.
L.J. 164, 169–78 (2017).
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salaries owed by the sovereign to its domestic employees.97 As long as
the clause was seen by the contracting parties as a meaningless artifact,
the breadth of the clause did not matter to the parties. However, under
the court’s injunction in NML v. Argentina, the scope of the clause
became of paramount importance. The breadth of the court’s
injunction halting payments to other creditors was directly dependent
on whether the holdout creditors had been promised pari passu
treatment with respect to that particular set of creditors.98 If not, then
there was no right to an injunction against those creditors.99
Our purpose in coding for scope was to see whether, once the New
York ratable payments interpretation was issued, parties became
concerned about the reach of their pari passu clauses. Assuming that
there was disagreement with the court’s interpretation, parties should
revise their contracts by narrowing the scope of pari passu in the post
NML v. Argentina clauses. We coded for whether the clause was
framed in terms of external indebtedness (the narrowest version); all
indebtedness (the intermediate category); or all obligations (the
broadest version).100
D. The Empirical Results of the Post-Litigation Study
1. All Issuers. We hypothesized that the parties to sovereign bond
contracts—realizing that a clause whose purpose they did not
understand was adding unnecessary risk—would either delete the
clause or amend its core language to reject the courts’ ratable payments
interpretation explicitly.101 This hypothesis seemed even more
plausible after the widely condemned ratable payments interpretation
was endorsed by the most important commercial courts in the United
States.102 Parties that disagree with the interpretation should either
delete the clause or clarify its meaning.
Indeed, commentary at the time of the SDNY interpretation
proposed deletion as a response. Buchheit and Martos, from the
leading sovereign debt firm of Cleary Gottlieb, wrote in the wake of
the NML v. Argentina decision:
97. See Olivares-Caminal, supra note 96 at 170–72.
98. See Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 96, at 225–28.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 231–32, 238 app. (describing the versions).
101. Leading lawyers in the field also shared this assumption. See, e.g., Buchheit & Martos,
supra note 87, at 491–92; Goss, supra note 55, at 288–90.
102. See supra notes 65–70 and accompanying text.
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The clause serves no useful function in countries whose laws do not
permit the involuntary subordination of an existing creditor, which is
why it does not appear in the standard documentation for domestic
debt issuances in most countries. So jettisoning the clause altogether
will not adversely affect the position of creditors and will avoid the risk
of further aberrant judicial interpretations down the road.103

The image accompanying the cover-page article in the New York
Law Journal by a lawyer from Arnold & Porter, another leading law
firm in the sovereign space, is equally illustrative.104

103. Buchheit & Martos, supra note 87, at 492 (emphasis added).
104. Berry, supra note 50, at 1.
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Despite this commentary from prominent sovereign debt lawyers,
there is no evidence in the dataset that parties deleted the pari passu
clause after the SDNY opinion. Indeed, not a single issuer deleted the
pari passu clause in response to any of the court decisions or to the IMF
report condemning them. Moreover, not a single bond added language
to articulate clearly the rights of creditors or the obligations of
sovereign debtors under the clause.
The data does show major and minor changes to the clause of the
types mentioned above—revisions that appear designed to reduce the
risk of future courts adopting the ratable payments interpretation.105
We examine the pattern of adoption of these major and minor
modifications in the June 2011 to May 2016 period. There was no real
movement to change any of the language of the core portion of the
clause in any direction for almost three years after the federal district
court’s first ratable payments interpretation in December 2011. In late
2014, however, revisions began to move dramatically toward the low
risk, Rank version of pari passu by removing the word “payment” from
the boilerplate term. This convergence on a single type of pari passu
clause served to eliminate the language that supported the ratable
payments interpretation in the New York and Brussels cases.106
We first report the percentage of issuances for all issuers in the
dataset that contain at least one change, whether major or minor, to
the pari passu clause. To determine a change, we use the pari passu
clause in a sovereign’s last offering prior to the start of the dataset in
2011 but after 2005 as the point of comparison (the “initial pari passu
clause”). Figure 1 reports for all issuers in the dataset. The data is
reported on a quarterly basis starting from the second quarter of 2011
to the second quarter of 2016. For each quarter we report the
percentage of bonds issued containing changes to the clause relative to
the initial pari passu clause. The vertical lines in Figure 1 are the points
at which key events occurred such as the SDNY decision (December
2011), the two appellate court decisions (October 2012 and August
105. See INT’L MONETARY FUND, PROGRESS REPORT ON THE INCLUSION OF ENHANCED
CONTRACTUAL PROTECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL SOVEREIGN BOND CONTRACTS 2 (2015),
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2015/091715.pdf [https://perma.cc/J3E5-R9F6].
106. For our analysis, we start with 1,583 issuances between June 1, 2011 to May 30, 2016, and
examine whether the pari passu clause for a sovereign or quasi-sovereign’s issuances on a
particular day is different from the issuer’s last issuance prior to the start of the dataset on June
1, 2011. For our analysis, we collapsed multiple issuances on the same day into one observation—
leaving us with 1281 unique issuer-issue date observations—and treated a change as occurring if
a particular change occurred for any of the issuances on that day relative to the last issuance prior
to June 1, 2011.
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2013), and the Supreme Court denial of certiorari (June 2014).
The 2011 SDNY decision produced no immediate reaction in the
data. For an entire year after that decision, only a small fraction of
sovereign or quasi-sovereign issuers made any major or minor changes
to their pari passu clauses. The inactivity in the market is even more
vivid if one considers the dollar amount of bond debt that was issued
during this period with unmodified versions of the clause. Figure 2
depicts the aggregate dollar amount of issuances by quarter for the
bonds in the dataset, categorized by those with and without a change
in the pari passu clause, where change is measured relative to a
sovereign’s initial pari passu clause. Figure 2 excludes those issuers that
had a low risk Rank clause as their initial pari passu clause—the
eventual market standard as we will see below. Excluding the Rank
version allows us to determine the dollar amount of bonds using an
unmodified clause that does not represent what the market eventually
views as the standard and is thus presumably optimal. As Figure 2
shows, over $1.5 trillion worth of sovereign and quasi-sovereign bond
debt was issued with such unmodified clauses during 2012 alone.
One might wonder here whether the market thought that the
SDNY decision was an outlier that was certain to be overturned and
therefore did not need to be taken seriously. Yet, in October 2012, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.
Though some changes in the pari passu clause then began to occur, the
large majority of issuances in both numbers and aggregate dollar
amount remained unchanged. During 2013, another $1.4 trillion of
bonds were issued, again without any revision to pari passu. A handful
of issuers did revise the contract language in 2013, but the
overwhelming majority of bonds were issued without any attempt to
modify or clarify their pari passu clauses.107 The first nine months of
2014 continued in the same fashion with another $0.9 trillion in bonds
issued without revisions in the issuers’ clauses, despite a June 2014 U.S.
Supreme Court’s denial of appeal from the Second Circuit.108
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate a simple point: If we assume that
continuing to use a clause presenting a significant risk of an
interpretation error imposes costs on the parties to the contract, then
107. As an aside, the Second Circuit reaffirmed its decision in August 2013, NML Capital,
Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d 230, 245–48 (2d Cir. 2013), but that action does not seem
to have had much of an effect.
108. The Supreme Court’s refusal to review the interpretation issue was likely anticipated by
the market in any event since the Supreme Court almost never takes contract interpretation cases
in the current era.
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it follows that substantial social costs were incurred because of an
apparently high level of inertia impeding change during this period.
Between June 1, 2011 and May 30, 2016, roughly $5.4 trillion worth of
sovereign and quasi-sovereign bonds were issued with terms that were
likely suboptimal.109 To be sure, the precise costs (in terms of the
additional risk of holdouts caused by using the risky term) vary across
bond issues depending on the likelihood of default and the precise
wording of the clause in question. But it seems plausible to conclude
that substantial costs were incurred because the market was so slow in
adjusting to the decisions of the New York courts.110
While change in the pari passu clause came only slowly after June
1, 2011, the pace of change increased after October 1, 2014. In Figure
1, note that the percentage of issuances with pari passu revisions for
those issuers not initially with the Rank version of the clause increases
more than 100 percent, from 9 percent in the third quarter of 2014 to
19 percent in the fourth quarter of 2014. In Figure 2, note that bond
offerings with a revised term by issuers not initially with the Rank
version accounted for 19 percent of the aggregate dollar amount of all
offerings in the third quarter of 2014 and then increased to 60 percent
of the aggregate dollar amount of all offerings in the fourth quarter of
2014. By the second quarter of 2016, bond offerings with a revised
contract clause or evidentiary patch accounted for 67 percent of the
aggregate dollar amount of all offerings. Moreover, all the major and
minor changes during this period were attempts to constrain or
repudiate the effects of the NML v. Argentina decision.
In sum, we see evidence of an extended period of inertia followed
by increasing volume of changes to the pari passu clause, particularly
after October 1, 2014. Our conjecture from observing this phenomenon

109. See Lucy McNulty, The Future for Pari Passu, INT’L FIN. L. REV., Mar. 2013, at 19, 19
(reporting from a survey of market actors in the sovereign debt industry that there was
widespread agreement as to the need for contract reform, yet tremendous inertia as a result of
the difficulties in coordinating a move to a new standard).
110. Although imprecise, a measure of the costs of an erroneous pari passu decision are
provided by the costs Argentina had to bear as a result of the decade-long litigation in New York.
Among the direct indications of these costs are the facts that Argentina was denied access to the
foreign capital markets for over a decade and the amounts it was eventually willing to pay holdout
creditors to be able to gain access in 2016. For a detailed discussion, see generally Martin Guzman,
An Analysis of Argentina’s 2001 Default Resolution (CIGI Working Paper No. 110, 2016).
Another illustration of the costs embedded in the use of a “risky” clause is the looming problem
in Venezuelan bonds that are on the verge of default. See Robin Wigglesworth, Small Print on
Venezuelan Debt Will Pique Wall Street’s Interest, FIN. TIMES (June 17, 2016), https://
www.ft.com/content/36ed3e64-324c-11e6-bda0-04585c31b153 [https://perma.cc/9S2S-P6RY].
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is that once clauses such as pari passu are encrusted with legal jargon
and repeated by rote over many years, they are impervious to
amendment for a considerable period.111 The eventual shift in the
market to adopt changes repudiating the ratable payment
interpretation to the pari passu clause allows us to rule out a plausible
competing hypothesis—that market participants in fact agreed with the
SDNY opinion and were thus content with their existing pari passu
terms.
To determine what caused the extended delay in effecting the
revisions to pari passu, we delve into the dynamics of the changes once
they began to occur. Of the bond issues in the dataset that reveal a
change in the pari passu clause relative to their last issuance before
June 1, 2011, 93.6 percent involve bonds issued directly by the
sovereign, or what we refer to as “pure sovereign” issuances.112
Accordingly, we next focus on the dynamics of pari passu changes for
the Pure Sovereign issuers.
2. Pure Sovereign Issuers. We start with an examination of major
changes in pari passu language for the pure sovereign issuers: these
major revisions involve the greatest reduction in the risk of holdouts
that variations in the pari passu clauses pose. We posit that sovereigns
face the greatest inertia costs in undertaking a major modification of
the pari passu clause. We focus especially on pure sovereign issuers
that are governed by foreign law, as sovereigns that issue under their
own local law will have other means to protect themselves against
holdouts besides modifying the pari passu clause.113 We therefore
111. Our hypothesis that black hole clauses are subject to extraordinary inertia costs finds
support in the reaction of the market to the Brussels decision in 2000. Rather than revise the pari
passu clause to eliminate the risk of a ratable payments interpretation, the market chose instead
to coordinate on revising the no-modification, or unanimous action, clauses in New York bonds
that required unanimous approval of all creditors to change contract terms prior to a
restructuring. Coordinating an agreement on revisions that lowered the vote to modify to 75
percent—thus increasing the burden on holdouts to obtain a blocking position—was
accomplished in a little over two years, from late 2001 to mid-2003. This revision ameliorated but
did not solve the holdout problem: it was preferred, we surmise, because, unlike pari passu, the
no-modification clauses were well understood and familiar to the market. For discussion of this
shift in contract language, see generally Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, Public Symbol in Private
Contract: A Case Study, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1627 (2006).
112. As contrasted to “quasi-sovereign” issues, which are issuances by cities, states, regions
within the sovereign state or issuances by some public or private corporate entity backed by a
sovereign guarantee.
113. The restructuring of Greek local-law governed bonds engineered via domestic legislation
in March 2012 is an example of the vulnerability of local-law bonds, as compared to foreign ones.
See generally Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Christoph Trebesch & Mitu Gulati, The Greek Debt
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expect that changes in the pari passu clause itself will occur primarily
for those pure sovereigns that issue bonds under foreign law, typically
English or New York law. Restricting our analysis to pure sovereign
issuances under foreign law left us with 791 issuances from June 1, 2011
to May 30, 2016.114
In Figure 3, we report the percentage of bond issues by pure
sovereign issuers under foreign law by quarter that involve a major
revision in the pari passu clause relative to the sovereign’s initial pari
passu clause. Note the dramatic increase in major revisions to the pari
passu clause after October 1, 2014. The percentage of revised clauses
issued by pure sovereigns under foreign law increases from 9 percent
in the third quarter of 2014 to 40 percent in the fourth quarter of 2014.
We use both quantitative and qualitative data to explain below why
October 2014 was so important.
Prior to October 2014, very few bonds issued by pure sovereigns
under foreign law included a major change to the pari passu clause.115
A different story emerges when we examine the minor modifications
made in response to the court cases in NML v. Argentina. As described
earlier, none of these minor modifications would have fully corrected
for the courts’ interpretation. Yet, minor modifications do appear and
potentially with some significance. To provide an example, Brazil
reported to investors in the risk disclosure section of its July 2014
prospectus supplement, the following:
Recent federal court decisions in New York create uncertainty
regarding the meaning of ranking provisions and could potentially
reduce or hinder the ability of sovereign issuers, including Brazil, to

Restructuring: An Autopsy, 28 ECON. POL’Y 513 (2013) (contrasting the treatment of the bonds
governed under different laws).
114. We examine whether the pari passu clause for a sovereign’s issuances on a particular day
differs from the sovereign’s last issuance prior to the start of the dataset on June 1, 2011. For our
analysis, we collapsed multiple issuances on the same day into one observation—leaving us with
545 unique issuer-issue date observations for pure sovereigns under foreign law—and treated an
amendment as occurring if a particular modification occurred for any of the issuances on that day
relative to the last issuance prior to June 1, 2011.
115. The first bond to disavow explicitly the ratable payments interpretation was an issuance
by Belize in June 2013, roughly eighteen months after the NML v. Argentina decision in the trial
court. See Buchheit & Martos, supra note 87, at 493. Belize was a first mover partly because it had
just gone through a restructuring, the first restructuring after the NML v. Argentina decision. See
Robin Wigglesworth, Belize Does “Superbond” Deal with Lenders, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2013),
https://www.ft.com/content/2817d01c-75d4-11e2-b702-00144feabdc0
[https://perma.cc/9DA63MK8].
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restructure their debt.116

It is perhaps an overstatement to suggest that this statement even
qualifies as a minor modification of pari passu. The disclosure here
does little more than inform the investor that there is a new risk that
remains in the documentation: at best, the statement conveys an
undertone of disapproval of the NML v. Argentina decision to a
future court.117
Figure 4 reports minor modifications relative to a sovereign’s
initial pari passu clause as a percentage of all pure sovereign issuances
under foreign law for each quarter of the dataset. Figure 3 showed that
there were no major shifts through 2012, and little response in 2013.
When we look at minor shifts in Figure 4, the data show some changes
in 2012 and increasing changes in 2013 and 2014. Market participants
appeared much more willing to experiment with minor shifts prior to
October 2014, as compared with major shifts. This is consistent with
higher inertia costs affecting efforts to modify directly the risk level of
a pari passu clause as opposed to modifications designed to provide
evidence on the meaning of the pari passu clause, given the evidentiary
vacuum of meaning for a black hole term. Notwithstanding the
evidentiary patches and other minor changes in the offering
prospectuses prior to October 2014, the overall pattern shown in Figure
3, for major shifts, remains the same for minor shifts as shown in Figure
4. After October 2014, there is a marked increase in the minor
modifications to the pari passu clause. All of the changes in Figure 4
are in the direction of constraining the effects of the NML v. Argentina
decision by limiting the risk of the pari passu clause.
3. The October Meetings. The timing of the cluster of changes, and
the sudden increase in the rate of change in October 2014 correlates
with a set of meetings at which a number of the key players in sovereign
debt law gathered. The first of those gatherings was held at Columbia
Law School immediately prior to the annual IMF/World Bank
meetings in Washington, D.C. The second was held shortly thereafter
at the New York Federal Reserve. Two of us hosted the Columbia Law
116. FEDERATED REPUBLIC OF BRAZ., PROSPECTUS SUPPLEMENT, 5% GLOBAL BONDS
DUE 2045, at S-8 (2014), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/205317/000119312514276243/
d761027d424b5.htm [https://perma.cc/HFE6-WHJD].
117. This sense of disapproval would be amplified further if one were to look at the amicus
brief filed by the government of Brazil asking the U.S. Supreme Court to hear the pari passu
dispute and reverse the lower court. Brief for the Federal Republic of Brazil as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, supra note 68, at 3–7.
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School meeting: at that juncture we had collected roughly three
quarters of the dataset, which showed clearly the slow response to
NML v. Argentina reported above. We were puzzled both by the lack
of revision to the core language of the various pari passu clauses,
despite the expressed dismay over the NML v. Argentina litigation, and
by the prevalence of a strategy that relied on minor modifications to
the risk disclosure sections of the bonds. To better understand the data,
we invited thirty of the most knowledgeable parties from both London
and New York to participate in a discussion of the data.118 We report
in Part III.C the content of the conversations with these senior
practitioners. Relevant here, however, is that many of the practitioners
expressed dissatisfaction with the draft clauses that ICMA and the
official sector had promulgated. Some were unhappy at not being
consulted during the ICMA drafting process, others objected to the
clause that had been proposed, and still others had clients who were
uncertain whether any revisions to the ratable payments interpretation
would advance their interests. At the conclusion of the Columbia
meeting, we assumed that any significant movement toward wholesale
revision of the clause was unlikely in the near term.
Senior representatives of the IMF, the U.S. Treasury and ICMA,
as well as senior lawyers who had been on the drafting committee for
the proposed revised clauses, attended the meeting at Columbia.
Dismayed by the conversation, senior statesmen in the group convened
a second meeting a few weeks later.119 Unlike the Columbia meeting,
this next session, hosted at the offices of the New York Federal
Reserve, was by invitation only. The Federal Reserve meeting was
comprised of a select group of elite lawyers, most of whom were at the
Columbia meeting as well. Almost all of the lawyers represented the
pure sovereign issuers, mostly emerging market sovereigns from Latin
America issuing bonds under New York or English law. Each of the
invitees understood that they were being asked by the public sector
118. For details on how the group was constructed, see infra note 142.
119. A key participant explained:
The Columbia meeting set the cat among the pigeons. [What we saw at the meeting]
was a good deal of unhappiness among the NY lawyers (and some of the large Latin
American sovereign issuers) with the drafting of the [ ] clauses. [That drafting had been
done primarily by the English lawyers in collaboration with ICMA and had an English
law style]. [In response to the problem] Cleary Gottlieb and Sullivan & Cromwell
quickly drafted “New York versions” of the clauses, intended to be substantively the
same but written in a more plain-speaking, Yankee homespun manner. FRBNY was
chosen because of its gravitas–the participants needed to understand this was important
[and that meeting at Columbia might have had the opposite effect].
Email from a meeting participant to Authors (Aug. 13, 2016) (on file with authors).
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authorities to contribute to a coordinated effort to combat the danger
posed by NML v. Argentina’s ratable payment interpretation.120
Sources who attended reported that the dynamics of the second
meeting were remarkably different from the Columbia session: instead
of the dissension at the first meeting, a consensus quickly emerged that
everyone involved needed, and was willing to, cooperate in trying to
solve the systemic problem caused by the rogue interpretation of the
New York courts.121 We cannot prove causation, but the data for the
sovereign issuers shows a remarkable change in late October 2014,
coinciding with the two New York meetings.122
4. The Pattern of Changes in Boilerplate: Rational Design or
Random Mutation. Figures 1 through 4 tell us that changes to the pari
passu clauses were slow to occur. But they do not give many clues as to
why, other than that something happened in October 2014 that
increased the rate of change significantly. We draw here from a
companion empirical article in which we conduct an econometric
analysis of that question.123
As described earlier, and as Figure 5 shows, we know that
sovereign issuers were not all using the same pari passu clauses at the

120. According to one source:
[It was made clear to the participants] that no one wanted to open the door on
substantive points being renegotiated. [The goal was to] spend a sufficient amount of
time describing the collaboration/engagement/orchestration between the parties and
the significant period of discussion on the substance that preceded it in the hope that
we could obtain buy in.
[Lengthy calls were had, I believe] with [many] of the participants on the contract
reforms and it was only after they understood the level of discussion and collaboration
and the “settled” nature of the end product (and its advantages fully) that they came
on board with not unpicking key elements.
Email from a meeting participant to Authors (Aug. 13, 2016) (on file with authors).
121. According to a participant:
Sitting at that table at the Fed were lawyers representing a substantial part of the
Latin American sovereign issuer and underwriter community. So when the U.S.
Treasury [representative] pronounced at the meeting that a consensus seemed to have
been reached, everyone left with the sense that they were morally committed to
encourage their clients to use the new NY clauses. Or at least not to discourage their
clients from using the clauses.
Email from a meeting participant to Authors (Aug. 14, 2016) (on file with authors).
122. There were more conversations about this topic at the annual World Bank/IMF meeting
during the roughly three-week period between the two meetings. In particular, there were
multiple sessions during the IMF/World Bank meetings for debt managers around the globe at
which experts on the pari passu litigation were asked to conduct seminars explaining the
implications of the ratable payments interpretation and how the contracts could be reformed.
123. See generally Choi et al., supra note 15 (using statistical survival models to gauge which
event spurred the adoption of new pari passu clauses).
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outset: some were more vulnerable than others to the risk of erroneous
interpretation posed by the NML v. Argentina litigation.124 Moreover,
some sovereigns with very high credit ratings might be thought to
present such a low probability of default that they were indifferent to
the type of pari passu clause used in their contracts. One might wonder
whether the issuers that modified their clauses earlier had the most
vulnerable clauses and/or the lowest credit ratings. Affirmative
answers to both those questions would suggest that the substantial
social costs described earlier were exaggerated. Yet no such neat
pattern appears in the data. There are some clearly identifiable subsets
of issuers for whom changes occur earlier than others. But the pattern
is not a clear correlation between speed of revision and strength of
credit ratings or vulnerability to the interpretation in NML v.
Argentina. Moreover, the initial revisions we observe do not involve
major changes to the contract language but rather more evidentiaryfocused minor modifications. The fact of sovereigns avoiding major
changes and attempting instead to add evidence of their understanding
of the existing contract language is consistent with the kind of
evidentiary vacuum that is characteristic of a black hole clause.125
The most clearly identifiable subset of issuers who undertook
either minor or major revisions are the pure sovereigns issuing bonds
under either English or New York law. Almost none of the changes
come from the quasi-sovereign issuers, such as government-guaranteed
bonds, bonds from cities and provinces, and supranational bonds. And,
importantly, these quasi-sovereign issuers are often the riskier debtors
as compared to the corresponding pure sovereign issuers. In our
empirical paper, we analyze the dynamics of change more specifically
within the subset of pure sovereign bonds issued under New York and
English laws. There, we run a statistical test of the predictions drawn
from two competing models of the dynamics of change in boilerplate
contracts.126
The first model is the traditional conception of contracting that we
call the “Rational Design” model.127 Here, contracting parties are
assumed to tailor contract terms rationally and optimally to their
124. See Weidemaier et al., supra note 87, at 84 fig.1 (describing the data from 1960 to 2011
for pure sovereign issuers).
125. See generally Choi et al., supra note 15 (detailing the evidentiary shifts, particularly
during the period between December 2011 and October 2014).
126. Id. at 22–32.
127. Id. at 3–4; see also Anderson & Manns, supra note 33, at 80 (calling this the “artisanal
model”).
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needs. If courts appear to err in interpreting contract language, parties
will respond promptly by revising the terms to clarify their joint intent.
In markets using standard forms, this process of error correction may
be slower owing to ordinary inertia costs: individual parties may, for
example, rationally prefer the network benefits from retaining the
original terms.128 Nevertheless, variation in the terms among parties
doing the same type of deal ultimately will result from the different
characteristics of the contracting parties.129 Rational Design predicts
that parties will adjust their pari passu clauses to account for different
perceptions of the risk of future default. For example, sovereigns who
anticipate, or wish to signal, a low risk of default will be motivated to
precommit not to restructure in the future by writing pari passu terms
that increase the risk of holdouts.130 In this model, contractual black
holes do not arise and, even if they did, they would not persist.
In the second, “Random Mutation” model, contract language in
standardized boilerplate is assumed to follow an essentially random
evolutionary path.131 Standardized contracts are rarely drafted from
scratch: they are largely copied from prior deals by agents with
imperfect and incomplete understanding of the prior deals and the
terms that regulate them.132 Rote usage and encrustation will occur,
particularly with contract terms that are widely used but are not
regularly tested or otherwise updated, and the result will be the
periodic creation of contractual black holes. Attempting to fit the
standard form to the particular requirements of an individual client
produces variation that contributes to the formulation of contractual
black holes. In this model, repairing black holes is more difficult
because of uncertainty. Parties are ignorant of the terms’ meaning and
of any incentive effects, and in this evidentiary vacuum, coordination
is required to effect a revision.
After running a series of tests pitting the two models against each
other, there is little evidence in the data to support the Rational Design
128. The value of having a standard form that everyone understands and can price accurately
produces positive network effects. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 34, at 731–33.
129. Scholars use the assumption of Rational Design to attempt to explain variation in the
pari passu context. See generally Benjamin Chabot & Veronica Santarosa, Don’t Cry for
Argentina (or Other Sovereign Borrowers): Lessons from a Previous Era of Sovereign Debt
Contract Enforcement, 12 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 9 (2017) (explaining the rationality behind lending to
sovereigns); Kahan & Leshem, supra note 40 (discussing the strategic consequences of pari passu
clauses); Wright, supra note 40 (discussing rationality of actions).
130. See supra note 129.
131. Choi et al., supra note 15, at 4.
132. E.g., Anderson & Manns, supra note 33, at 80–84; Richman, supra note 33, at 81–82.
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model.133 A case such as NML v. Argentina should motivate a revision
of the contracts under both the Rational Design and Random Mutation
models, but the character of the revisions should be dramatically
different in each case. The clearest differential prediction from the two
models is that revisions should result in the same amount of variation
across issuers as prior to the court decision shock if the Rational Design
story is true—after all, variation is optimal, rational and desired. In
contrast, the revisions postshock should result in a reduction in
variation under the Random Mutation model, according to which
variation is essentially random, unintended and creates unnecessary
risk. Figure 5 provides a graphical depiction of the frequency of
different sovereign offerings by type of pari passu clause. After the
October 2014 meetings that led to collectivizing consensus in the
marketplace, we see a dramatic reduction from 2015 to 2016 in the
variation in the types of clauses in response to NML v. Argentina.134
Prior to the case, there was a range of pari passu clauses of different
risk levels.135 After the case, all of the changes that take place push
towards a single form of the clause—the low risk Rank version which
is also the original version of pari passu. This movement to eliminate
the variation is consistent with the Random Mutation model and not
with the Rational Design model.136 Interestingly, the movement of
these revisions toward the oldest variant of pari passu does not
eliminate the risk of holdouts entirely, as the adoption of a Mandatory
Law clause would do (see our categorization in Table I). Instead these
market-wide effects appear to reflect a conscious decision in the
market to return to the original version of pari passu.
In sum, as of June 2016, the data on bonds issued by the pure
sovereigns under New York and English law indicate the vast majority
of new issuances are moving to the low risk Rank form of the clause
and explicitly rejecting the ratable payments interpretation. And,
invariably, this new language is the formulation prescribed by ICMA
and endorsed by the IMF’s report, thus highlighting the importance of
coordinating forces in spurring the movement in the market to the

133. Choi et al., supra note 15, at 31–34.
134. We performed a chi-squared test of the proportions of the different types of pari passu
clauses for each year in our study time period as depicted in Figure 5. The chi-squared test
indicated that the difference in the proportions for the different types of pari passu clauses across
the years is significant (prob. = 0.000).
135. See Weidemaier et al., supra note 88, at 84–89.
136. See Choi et al., supra note 15, at 11.
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original version of pari passu.137
In our empirical paper, we also find that the following indicators
correlate with the likelihood of a sovereign modifying the pari passu
clause earlier rather than later: (a) representation by a law firm that is
a market leader in terms of the volume of clients it represents;138 (b)
location in Latin America, a region whose New York lawyers
constituted the bulk of the participants at the two coordination
meetings held in October 2014;139 and (c) whether the issuer had
defaulted and restructured sometime over the past ten years.140 These
factors, as we explain in Part IV, point towards the reasons for
resistance to change being a combination of difficulties in coordinating
change and the agency costs of lawyers and government debt managers
being focused on the short-term goal of getting deals done.141
E. Interviews with Market Players
The data—showing extraordinary resistance to changes in pari
passu language for the first three years of the study followed by a
dramatic shift toward uniformity in pure sovereign issuances that is
accelerating to the present day—reveal patterns of behavior that are
confounding. To better understand this phenomenon, we turned first
to the transactional lawyers who produced the contract terms and
disclosure documents for the bonds in our data. As noted above, we
hosted a conference at Columbia University Law School in early
October 2014, shortly before the Fall IMF/World Bank meetings. We
asked the gathered experts142 if they might help answer two core
137. The ICMA recommended clause from August 2014 reads as follows:
The Notes are the direct, unconditional and unsecured obligations of the Issuer and
rank and will rank pari passu, without preference among themselves, with all other
unsecured External Indebtedness of the Issuer, from time to time outstanding,
provided, however, that the Issuer shall have no obligation to effect equal or ratable
payment(s) at any time with respect to any such other External Indebtedness and, in
particular, shall have no obligation to pay other External Indebtedness at the same time
or as a condition of paying sums due on the Notes and vice versa.
INT’L CAPITAL MKT. ASS’N, STANDARD PARI PASSU PROVISION FOR THE TERMS AND
CONDITIONS OF SOVEREIGN NOTES (2014), https://www.icmagroup.org/assets/documents/
Resources/ICMA-Standard-Pari-Passu-Provision-August-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/FK9B-QY
JY].
138. Choi et al., supra note 15, at 25, 26.
139. Id. at 27.
140. Id. at 26.
141. See infra Part IV.A.1 and IV.A.2 respectively.
142. We explained that we would present our initial findings and hoped to gather their
reactions. On hearing about the meeting, a number of other senior lawyers, bankers, and
policymakers also asked to be included in the discussion. This resulted in a session with roughly
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questions: First, what explains the failure of the sovereign debt industry
to modify or amend pari passu now that multiple New York courts
have handed down a ratable payments interpretation? And, second,
what was the best strategy going forward to combat this problematic
interpretation?
We recorded what was said at the meeting and then had individual
conversations or email exchanges with each of the attending lawyers,
not all of whom responded.143 One theme was expressed by a number
of the lawyers, and echoed in the conversations after the October 2014
meeting. Sovereign clients were not yet comfortable making changes
to their clauses. To pursue this theme, one of us then conducted a series
of interviews with sovereign clients through senior officials at
government debt offices. In Part III.E, we report on conversations with
these government debt managers. Finally, we spoke to senior managers
at fifteen investment firms that had specialties investing in government
debt.144 Taken together, we spoke to over a hundred different
individuals actively involved in the sovereign debt markets.
1. Reasons for the Lack of Revision as of October 2014. When
interviewed during 2008–2011, these same lawyers gave two primary
reasons for not modifying or amending their clauses in response to the
ratable payments interpretation from Brussels in 2000. First, ratable
payments was a bizarre interpretation from an inexpert court in

thirty senior sovereign debt lawyers from both the private and public sectors.
Our process of selection was simple. Using prior research on the role of lawyers in the
sovereign debt market, we invited the senior partners from the ten leading firms in New York and
London, the two leading jurisdictions for sovereign debt issuances. This gave an initial set of
roughly twenty invitees. Three of the London lawyers who were not planning to be in the United
States for the World Bank/IMF meetings later that week declined. However, a number of those
invited asked whether they could bring colleagues from their firms. This resulted in a total of
twenty-four attendees from major law firms. In addition, we invited senior counsel from the major
official sector institutions such as the U.S. Treasury, the IMF and the Federal Reserve, and the
major industry groups such as the Emerging Markets Traders Association and ICMA, which gave
a total of thirty participants.
143. We also asked these questions at a meeting in Paris, in October 2014, with a number of
European sovereign debt lawyers and policymakers. This meeting was organized by Rodrigo
Olivares-Caminal of Queen Mary Law School. The format of this second conference followed the
presentation plus audience questions format, and there were about a dozen lawyers and
policymakers. We presented the same data and took notes on the responses, which were
substantially similar to the ones we received in New York.
144. The majority of this latter set of interviews were done as part of a project that one us is
doing with Anna Gelpern and Jeromin Zettelmeyer that is focused on the question of how market
participants think (and talk) about the price impact of making contract modifications. See Gelpern
et al., supra note 26, at 4–13.
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Brussels made in the context of an ex parte hearing, and no New York
or London court would rule in such a fashion. Second, modifying the
clause would send a negative signal to any future court faced with the
same interpretive issue: it would imply that the original boilerplate was
ambiguous and thus make it more susceptible to the ratable payments
meaning.
In October 2014, neither of the prior explanations for inaction
seemed valid. A New York federal district court had affirmed a ratable
payments interpretation that twice was endorsed unanimously by the
leading appellate court on business matters, followed by a denial of
certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court despite arguments to the court in
favor of reversal by four different nations, a Nobel laureate in
economics, and a former Deputy Director of the IMF.145 So, why had
the clause still not been modified?
a. The Perfect Storm. The initial response from the New York
lawyers was that the New York interpretation was a function of
unusual facts. “A perfect storm,” stated one senior attorney.146
Argentina had apparently angered SDNY Federal District Judge
Thomas Griesa to an unusual degree by the lack of respect it had shown
him and his rulings over the decade or so that the litigation had
proceeded.147 Argentina also made the strategic error of passing an
explicit law that made the holdout creditors functionally junior to
everyone else.148 But neither the trial nor appellate court clarified
whether its decision was based on the unusual facts at issue—the law
that Argentina passed, its unusually bad behavior, etc.—or on its

145. See supra notes 59–69 and accompanying text.
146. Audio tape: Columbia Law School Meeting (Oct. 2014) (on file with authors).
147. Accounts of how Argentina had angered and frustrated Judge Griesa are numerous. See,
e.g., Tomás M. Araya, A Decade of Sovereign Debt Litigation: Lessons From the NML v.
Argentina Case and the Road Ahead, 17 BUS. L. INT’L 83, 99 (2016) (“The 2012/2014 decisions
from Judge Griesa and the Court of Appeals were undoubtedly connected with the Republic’s
attitude of disrespect of the US judicial system . . . .”); see also Sheelah Kholhatkar, A Judge’s
Rage Goes Ignored While Argentina Sidesteps Holdout Hedge Funds, BLOOMBERG:
BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 30, 2014), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-09-30/
argentina -vs-dot-holdout-hedge-funds-judge-griesas-rage-is-ignored [https://perma.cc/3MEZJG2S] (discussing Judge Greisa’s anger toward Argentina); Alexandra Stevenson, Frustrated
Judge Scolds Argentina but Does Not Hold It in Contempt, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Aug. 21,
2014), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/08/21/frustrated-judge-scolds-argentina-but-does-nothold-it-in-contempt [https://perma.cc/N6BK-ZWH4] (discussing Judge Griesa’s frustration with
Argentina).
148. See generally Weidemaier, supra note 63 (discussing the passage of the “Lock Law,”
among other factors, that resulted in the court’s decision).
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finding that the explicit terms of the pari passu clause required
Argentina to pay the holdouts ratably.149 If it had not been before, it
now was clear that the clause lacked any plausible shared meaning, and
there was a substantial risk that a court would resolve the linguistic
uncertainty in favor of the ratable payments interpretation. Those two
facts argued for repairing the clause promptly, regardless of any
complaints about what the courts had done. That did not happen.
Instead, these same lawyers devoted considerable efforts over the next
two years pursuing every available avenue to have the ratable
payments interpretation overturned in court.
Our conclusion from the foregoing is that the lawyers across the
industry—who worked diligently to generate support for numerous
amicus briefs—must have believed it would be more difficult to
persuade the industry to modify the boilerplate than to organize
industry efforts to persuade the appellate courts to reverse the trial
court. And the difficulty the proponents had in generating the industrywide litigation position opposing NML v. Argentina implies that it must
be even more difficult to change certain boilerplate contract terms. But
why?
b. British Courts Are Better. The English lawyers had a different
response from their U.S. counterparts. They claimed that no British
court would ever rule in the same narrowly textualist fashion as the
New York courts.150 Their confidence that, unlike the U.S. courts, a
British court would look to market practice to rule out a ratable
payments interpretation struck us as unwarranted, especially because
149. See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 258–60, 264 n.16; see also
Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 96, at 2–3 (discussing this aspect of the cases).
150. The appellate court opinion focused on the use of the word “payment” in Argentina’s
pari passu clause but made little attempt to interpret the meaning of the text in harmony with the
other words in the bond contract. NML Capital, Ltd., 699 F.3d at 258–60. In reports issued under
the auspices of the Bank of England, a group of the most eminent U.K. sovereign debt lawyers
has on multiple occasions expressed its view in writing that U.K. courts would not make that
mistake as a matter of English law. See FIN. MKTS. LAW COMM., ISSUE 79 – PARI PASSU CLAUSES
22 (2005); FIN. MKTS. LAW COMM., ROLE USE AND MEANING OF PARI PASSU CLAUSES IN
SOVEREIGN DEBT AS A MATTER OF ENGLISH LAW 1 (2014); FIN. MKTS. LAW COMM., ANALYSIS
OF THE ROLE, USE AND MEANING OF PARI PASSU CLAUSES IN SOVEREIGN DEBT AS A MATTER
OF ENGLISH LAW 10–11 (2015); see also Lachlan Burn, Pari Passu Clauses: English Law After
NML v. Argentina, 9 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 2, 2–9 (2013) (“There is almost no risk that English courts,
faced with similar facts to NML v Argentina, would adopt the ‘payment’ interpretation.”); Tolek
N. Petch, NML v Argentina in an English Legal Setting, 9 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 266, 271 (2013) (“It
follows that the approach endorsed by the Court of Appeals would be found wanting in an English
court. There is therefore no reason to revisit standard pari passu wording in sovereign bond
documentation issued under English law.”).
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there was no clear market understanding of the clause’s meaning. A
British court had been asked to interpret pari passu in Kensington
International Ltd. v. Republic of the Congo but elected to sidestep the
interpretive question.151 And, more recently, a former President of the
U.K. Supreme Court opined on behalf of the holdout creditors that
Judge Griesa’s ratable payments interpretation was correct under
English contract law.152 Nevertheless, the British lawyers were
unmoved: This episode was the result of the flaws in U.S. contract law,
and many predicted that sovereign issuers, unhappy with the U.S.
courts’ failure to examine market understandings, would now issue
their bonds under English law rather than New York law.153
Our data actually show that since October 2014, lawyers at the big
British law firms have been altering the pari passu clauses in pure
sovereign issuances governed by English law at roughly the same rate
as their U.S. counterparts. We asked a subset of the British lawyers
about the apparent inconsistency between their current actions and
their prior assertions. They explained that despite the trivial risk of an
incorrect interpretation by a British court, revisions were necessary
because the standard documentation package for sovereigns issuing
under foreign laws has now been changed. And clients want the
standard package of clauses that is appropriate for their type of issuer.
c. Our Clients Are Uncertain What to Do. At the public discussion
at Columbia Law School in October 2014, one participating lawyer
raised the matter of client preferences. This lawyer, an industry group
representative rather than a senior law firm partner, said quietly that
151. Kensington Int’l Ltd. v. Congo [2003] EWHC (Comm) 2331 [91]; Kensington Int’l Ltd.
v. Congo [2003] EWCA (Civ) 709 [13] (approving the decision); see also GLOBAL LAW
INTELLIGENCE UNIT, ALLEN & OVERY, THE PARI PASSU CLAUSE AND THE ARGENTINE CASE
10–11 (2012), http://www.allenovery.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/The%20pari%20passu%20
clause%20and%20the%20Argentine%20case.pdf [https://perma.cc/G5RS-RYKD] (discussing
the case).
152. Former Lord Chief Justice Phillips, in his filing in support of the plaintiffs, wrote:
An English court would approach the problem of interpreting the [pari passu]
clause with a wish, if possible, to give it the same meaning as that which it now bears
under the law of New York . . . . I consider that the application of the principles of
construction that apply under English law would result in it doing just that.
Declaration of Lord Nicholas Phillips K.G., P.C. at 24, Red Pines LLC v. Republic of Argentina,
No. 1:14-CV-09427 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2016). As his declaration tells us, Judge Phillips was quite
familiar with the NML Capital, Ltd. v. Argentina litigation, since the appeal in that case in 2011
had come before him; although the pari passu interpretation issue was not raised. Declaration of
Lord Nicholas Phillips K.G., P.C., supra, at 2.
153. The data we collected for this paper shows that, as of May 31, 2016, not a single issuer
switched from New York to English law in the wake of Judge Griesa’s decision in December 2011.
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perhaps one reason the clauses were not being modified was that some
of the clients were not as confident as the lawyers in the room that the
New York courts’ interpretation should be disavowed. A number of
the participants agreed with this evaluation of their clients’ interests.
In effect, we were told: “We haven’t been able to modify the clause
because at least some of our clients are not convinced that is the best
thing to do.” The inference was that while they agreed with the IMF
and others that the courts’ decisions were incorrect,154 clients had not
seen any strong negative reaction from the market to the pari passu
decisions in NML v. Argentina, other than for Argentina itself.155
Lee Buchheit, the dean of sovereign debt lawyers, explained why
lawyers had not been able simply to delete the pari passu clause after
NML v. Argentina:
The principal drawback of a textual amputation of the clause is
optical; it will leave a gaping hole in the term sheets, rating agency
reports and tick-the-box summaries of the features of new debt
issuances. Never having had a clear idea of what purpose the pari passu
clause actually served in a cross-border debt instrument, underwriters
and most investors will surely not have a clear idea of the implications
of not having it. The guiding principle of the underwriting community
in matters of documentation has always been that if it was good
enough for my father, it’s good enough for me. Excising the clause
altogether could therefore entail a significant educational initiative.156

d. The Past Is Irrelevant. Perhaps unsurprisingly given the drama
caused by the pari passu litigation, a number of scholars have
embarked on investigations into the original meaning of the clause in
sovereign instruments.157 Both Sung Hui Kim and Anna Gelpern, each
examining different sets of archival records,158 found evidence that the
most likely understanding of the clause in a dispute over Nazi bonds in
154. For a discussion of the lawyer’s views, see infra Part III.E.1.d.
155. This lack of a negative market reaction perceived by the respondents is consistent with
what the most recent research shows as well. See Faisal Z. Ahmed & Laura Alfaro, Market
Reactions to Sovereign Litigation, 12 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 141, 154 tbl.1, 156 fig.3 (2017) (finding no
abnormal negative returns from the NML case for any Latin American sovereign issuers’ bonds,
other than Argentina itself).
156. Buchheit & Martos, supra note 87, at 492 (emphasis added).
157. See Anna Gelpern, Courts and Sovereigns in the Pari Passu Goldmines, 11 CAP. MKTS.
L.J. 251, 254–56 (2016); Sung Hui Kim, Pari Passu: The Nazi Gambit, 9 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 1, 243
(2014).
158. Kim looked at diplomatic correspondence in the archives in Geneva. Kim, supra note
157, at 242–50. Gelpern looked at transcripts of court decisions and related memos in archives in
Geneva. Gelpern, supra note 157, at 253–54.
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the 1930s was that it required ratable payments.159 Ben Chabot’s
archival research into the infamous Black Eagle bonds issued by
Mexico a century ago suggests that ratable payments was the most
likely understanding of the clause at that time as well.160
Given that no one currently in the industry appeared to
understand the meaning of the clause, we asked whether this historical
evidence affected the thinking of contemporary lawyers. But the
lawyers did not find the historical research to be relevant to the
question of what the clause meant in the contemporary context.
One eminent lawyer responded:
The context today is completely different. You are dredging up
meanings from a period where there was absolute sovereign
immunity and where gunboats were the primary means of
enforcement. We don’t have either of those things today.161

That response brought us back to the original puzzle: If history was
irrelevant to unearthing the meaning of the clause and there was no
real contemporary understanding, why was the clause being used at
all?
2. The Courts Failed to Solve a Systemic Problem. Despite the
often-puzzling responses to our questions, a coherent story does
emerge from the interviews with the leading lawyers in the sovereign
bond industry. All of these lawyers share the strong view held by the
official sector (the IMF, the U.S. Treasury, Paris Club, and others) and
by ICMA that by undermining the ability of a defaulting sovereign to
restructure its debt, the ratable payments interpretation was
systemically harmful to the global economy in general and to the
market for sovereign bonds in particular.162 Yet, the lawyers were
reluctant to act on that belief because their commitment to the industry
may have conflicted with the interests of certain clients. Taking their
statements at face value, the U.S. lawyers viewed the risk of future
159. Gelpern, supra note 157, at 272–73; Kim, supra note 157, at 249–50.
160. Chabot & Gulati, supra note 47, at 235–36. Pablo Triana provides another historical
examination of the origins of the pari passu clause. See generally Triana, supra note 47 (finding a
pari passu clause in the bonds of a sub sovereign, the City of Edinburgh, in 1838).
161. Email from a meeting participant to Authors (Aug. 14, 2016) (on file with authors).
162. As an example, the Financial Times quotes the Nobel laureate Joe Stiglitz as saying of
the case: “It’s a disaster for the world . . . . It sets an enormously bad precedent and will cause a
lot of anxiety in the global financial system.” Robin Wigglesworth & Elaine Moore, Sovereign
Debt: Curing Defaults, FIN. TIMES (June 7, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/90dc38fa-241211e6-aa98-db1e01fabc0c [https://perma.cc/BM2Q-FENU].
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courts following the “precedent” of NML v. Argentina as small owing
to the “perfect storm” that engulfed that case. Similarly, the British
lawyers held the view that British courts would rely more heavily on
industry “experts” than on the textualist jurisprudence of the Second
Circuit. To be sure, one could interpret those beliefs as simply a
justification for inaction in the face of perceived conflicts among client
interests. Given those conflicts, the lawyers all agree that by applying
the reigning principles of contract interpretation, the courts in NML v.
Argentina failed to prevent systemic risk to the industry and left
individual law firms in a quandary. How can a standard boilerplate
contract adequately represent the interests of diverse clients with very
different interests?
But the preceding story only explains why no efforts to reject
the ratable payments gloss on pari passu occurred between June 2011
and October 2014. Yet to be explained are two remaining puzzles:
What then stimulated the dramatic increase in modified clauses in pure
sovereign bonds issued shortly after October 2014? And why are the
revisions that reject the ratable payment interpretation confined to
pure sovereign issuances yet are virtually nonexistent in other bond
categories, even though the same sovereigns whose clauses have been
modified are often ultimately responsible for these other bond issues
as well? Put differently, the risks posed by a ratable payments
interpretation are the same or worse in those other bonds.
F. Reports from the Clients
In talking to the sovereign clients in twenty-seven different
countries spanning three continents, ranging from AAA issuers to
emerging market issuers, we focused on the managers at government
debt offices. These debt offices are the primary clients in a sovereign
bond deal, even though, in theory, investment banks are on the other
side of the transaction. The lawyers for the investment banks on a
sovereign deal tend to be what are called “designated underwriter’s
counsel”: the sovereign debtor is the one who picks the counsel for the
investment banks.163 Bradley and coauthors report that while the
investment banks that manage a deal for the sovereign issuer tend to
change from issuance to issuance, the designated underwriter’s counsel
tends to stay the same over long periods of time.164 The logic is that
these lawyers develop over time a deep understanding of the debtor
163. Bradley et al., supra note 58, at 153.
164. Id.
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and can more easily prepare the relevant legal documents.165 While in
some cases the sovereign debtor will have a different law firm as its
primary counsel, it is often the case that the designated underwriter’s
counsel is the only set of external lawyers for the deal. Further, it is the
issuer who usually picks up the cost of the lawyers, whether they use
two sets of lawyers or just one.
What we report below is drawn largely from interviews one of us
conducted for a project asking how government debt managers think
about the pricing of contract provisions in sovereign debt.166 In
particular, we asked the debt managers from the different debt offices
two questions: First, what was their view of the risk posed by the
ratable payments interpretation in NML v. Argentina for the type of
clauses they were using? And, second, to the extent they had issued
both sovereign and quasi-sovereign bonds, what were their reasons for
using different types of pari passu clauses in these different issuances?
1. The Reasons That Might Induce Revision: Standard Practice and
Investor Preference. The sovereign debt lawyers had told us that many
clients from the government debt offices were unsure of the best
response to the NML v. Argentina decisions. The subset of clients
interviewed uniformly confirmed that view. In every case, the debt
managers were aware of the litigation by the hedge funds and that
payments to the creditors holding restructured bonds had been frozen
as a result. But in no case did these debt managers—over sixty senior
officials across the various debt offices—seem to have a strong view of
what they should do in response. We heard few statements of dismay
at what the New York courts generally had done or Judge Griesa
specifically had done.167 And relatedly, there was no expressed desire
165. Id.
166. See generally Gelpern et al., supra note 26 (describing interviews conducted with
government debt managers between 2013 and 2017).
167. Our colleague, who ran three separate training sessions for the debt managers in
Washington, D.C. during the period between the first Columbia Law meeting and the New York
Federal Reserve meeting, said that the debt managers struck her as annoyed with the New York
decisions (at least, more so than they were when we met with them some months later). In an
email, she wrote:
[T]he debt managers were angrier about the [NY] decisions than the lawyers-reaction
was anger and disbelief, that is why I was invited to present to the debt managers as a
group [three] times in different places (not to or with their lawyers), and that is why all
those [debt managers] agreed to see us-they felt like they needed an independent
understanding of the matter. But they also thought the problem was with the court and
had to be fixed somewhere in a more centralized way, perhaps in the courts or in the
legislature (this was [especially] true of non-lawyers and people from continental legal
[systems]). The contracts were a fallback, risk management on the margins pending
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to avoid New York law or New York courts in future sovereign
instruments.
The debt managers for the most part thought that the outcome of
the NML v. Argentina litigation was bad. But they did not seem
particularly concerned that the meaning of a key provision in many of
their own bonds had been challenged. The explanation for not
immediately changing their clauses was largely consistent across the
debt offices: They would change their pari passu clauses when and if
their lawyers told them that the standard boilerplate formulations were
changing. A number of the debt managers emphasized the importance
of having a lawyer who was in constant contact with the IMF legal
department and was current on the latest improvements in the
standard forms for sovereign bonds. Their preferences appeared to be
driven by what the IMF considered to be “good practice.” But other
than changes to the standard forms that were emanating from the IMF,
the primary audience they were serving were the investors who were
repeat purchasers of their bonds—specifically the dealers or bankers
doing the initial placements. And those investors were not clamoring,
or even murmuring, that they wanted the clauses changed one way or
the other.
We pressed: What if the investors wanted a version of the clause
that was even more susceptible to the ratable payments interpretation?
Wouldn’t there be a negotiation over how many basis points that would
cost? In their view, these questions revealed a fundamental
misunderstanding on our part of the way prices for bonds were set and
the relevance of contract terms such as pari passu to prices. In fact,
there were no pricing decisions based on the “legal terms” of the
document (the terms that the lawyers draft) in contrast to the “business
terms” that impact the bonds’ selling price.
Legal terms may need to be changed because the relevant
standard template has changed. But that, as one senior manager told
us, is to ensure that the legal terms do not impact the price.168 There
are terms that are relevant to the price—such as the currency, maturity,
global solution. The [question] for [the debt managers] was whether their existing
[contracts] expose them to such a degree that they cannot afford to wait. And for most,
the answer was no.
Email from a meeting participant to Authors (Jan. 10, 2016) (on file with authors).
168. See generally Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, How Much Is This Clause? Debt Managers
on Pricing Bond Contract Terms 11–12 (Aug. 25, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
the Duke Law Journal) (“Once the sovereign . . . settles on . . . price, the lawyers may be asked to
‘paper the deal’ in line with this decision. . . . In other words, price-setting occurs apart from any
variation in legal terms.”).
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and governing law, the material that appears on the term sheet169—but
legal terms such as pari passu and negative pledge are not part of that
equation. The job of the lawyer, one of the first debt managers we
interviewed explained, was to make sure that he or she was “irrelevant
to the transaction.”170 The managers and their investors want to be able
to set the price as a function of the “stuff that matters”—the economics
of the sovereign debtor, not whether an obscure clause contained the
word “payment.”171
Undeterred, we asked: “But even if the investors are not sure of
what they want and don’t care about the pricing of the legal terms,
don’t you want to draft your clauses so that you can ensure a smooth
restructuring in the event that you ever go into default?” We were told
that what we were suggesting was simply not done. The job of the
lawyers was not to draft terms to protect the sovereign in case an
adverse event occurred in the future. Instead, the lawyer’s sole task was
to ensure that the right standard template was used. If the form is
standard for a particular category of issuer, then neither side has to
worry about the legal terms: both parties know that they have the
standard package and neither side is trying to take advantage of the
other in terms of the contract provisions. Pricing then can be done
independently of the legal terms, one respondent explained, when
neither side is worried about the lawyers inserting terms to help their
clients deal with a future event such as a default.
a. The Variation in the Clauses. Given that the debt managers
were emphasizing the importance of using “the standard” provisions,
we next asked them what each meant by “standard.” We knew that
standard did not mean identical, since there was considerable variation
across issuers in terms of the precise wording of the clauses. But in
addition—and here is where we focused our questions—many
sovereigns had variations in the types of pari passu clauses they were
using in their own bonds. Standard, to reiterate, didn’t seem
particularly standard. So why the variation? Was it because the
investors in one type of bond had made a different bargain with the
debtors than in another bond?
Our starting premise was wrong, we were told. There was no

169. See id. at 3, 11.
170. See generally id. (“The widely-held view was that, in the ideal world, non-financial
(‘legal’) terms in sovereign bonds should be irrelevant.”).
171. Id. at 42.
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bargaining between the issuer and the creditors over the type of pari
passu clause that would be used. Instead, the clauses were the ones that
were standard for that type of issuance. The standard template for pure
sovereign issuances under New York and English law was changing
and that was why the sovereign bond contracts under those laws were
changing accordingly. The templates for the other types of issuance,
such as sovereign guaranteed bonds or local law governed sovereign
bonds, had not been addressed by the IMF/ICMA initiative, so those
bonds were not changing. Moreover, the debt managers explained
further, primary responsibility for anything but the pure sovereign
issuances lay with a different set of bureaucrats and lawyers.172 To be
sure, all of these obligations—and there are many hundreds of them in
the period—would probably end up on the sovereign’s balance sheet if
there were a sovereign default.173 But amending or modifying the
clauses in those other bonds was not something that concerned the debt
managers for the sovereigns, and it was not even something that they
planned to discuss with their colleagues who did the other types of
issuances.174
None of the foregoing is meant to suggest that the managers were
disinterested in learning about the clauses in their own bonds and what
the variations were in the clauses within their countries’ issuances.
They were curious about the implications of having one variation in a
clause versus another, but nothing they learned about the different
172. See id. at 21 (explaining, in the context of drafting contracts for sovereign guarantees and
issuances by sub-sovereigns, like regions, that there is often a strict division of responsibility with
the debt managers for the sovereigns generally not coordinating with the managers for the quasi
sovereigns about what terms to use).
173. On the issue of the large number of sovereign debt guarantees outstanding and the
prospect of them all migrating to the sovereign’s balance sheet in the event of a crisis, see Elaine
Moore & Jonathan Wheatley, Fears Mount Over Rise of Sovereign-Backed Corporate Debt, FIN.
TIMES (Jan. 5, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/2f23839c-b320-11e5-8358-9a82b43f6b2f [https://
perma.cc/P6DE-2DDP].
174. One senior debt manager for a country that had not, as yet in early 2016, changed its
clauses explained:
We will change the clauses in our foreign law bonds, the next time we do our issuance.
Our outside lawyers know the IMF’s recommendations. The local law bonds are
different. We have pari passu clauses in them. But we have only one lawyer in our
department. We put pari passu clauses in because we wanted outside investors to buy
local bonds–and investors are used to seeing these clauses. They have a check list. Pari
passu, negative pledge, exchange listing . . . there are a set of things they look to see
whether they are present. If so, they are okay with the bond. So, we put pari passu in.
Seemed okay, since everyone else has it. [X country] also has it in their local law bonds.
We are not a strong issuer; we need to make investors comfortable with our bonds. We
only now noticed [after reading your article] that there are differences in the wording
of our local law and foreign law pari passu clauses. We will change that.
Email from debt manager to Authors (Aug. 14, 2016) (on file with authors).
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levels of risk appeared to motivate them to remedy their clauses: that
was just not how the process of changing standard boilerplate worked.
They did, however, care about the IMF’s strong support for the new
market standards and about being seen as good global citizens from the
IMF’s perspective. In this vein, every one of the debt offices where we
talked to managers who had not yet changed the clauses in their foreign
law bonds told us that they would be changing soon. Their investors
would want to have standard clauses, and they did not want to be on
the IMF’s list of nonresponsive countries.175
b. No Midstream Changes. The final question posed to the debt
managers concerned the wisdom of changing the pari passu provisions
in their older bonds, given that their plan was to revise the pari passu
clauses in their future bonds. In theory, this action would be favored
by both issuers and their creditors assuming both feared that the older
pari passu clauses could be exploited in the future by holdout creditors.
If so, then why not change the clauses with a vote of the creditors
during the good times when there were no holdout creditors: a vote
between 50 percent and 75 percent of the bondholders could have
deleted or modified the pari passu clauses in every one of the bonds at
issue.
Few of the debt managers seemed to have given this question
much consideration.176 They were willing to consider changing new
bond issues because the IMF, ICMA, and their outside counsel were
telling them that the standard forms were changing. Moreover, this
change was important for systemic reasons and they were willing to be
good global citizens. But the IMF was asking them to revise the terms
of their old bonds as well, and this was not something they were willing
to do. Those changes would cost money that neither the sovereign debt

175. One debt manager explained why avoiding the IMF’s black list was important:
The investors have not demanded it [change] yet. But they want the standard forms.
And if the standard has changed, they will want the new standard. Also, we don’t want
to be on the list of countries that have not fixed their contracts. We were on the list that
the IMF put out. That was not good. But the bond we did was a small one, private
issuance, and the investor did not ask. We tried to explain to the IMF, but they put us
on the list [of those who had not changed] anyway. Not good. Next time, we will have
changed.
Email from debt manager to Authors (Aug. 14, 2016) (on file with authors).
176. The one debt manager who had considered doing an exchange of his old bonds appeared
to wish to be seen as a leader and innovator in the world of debt managers. But, as of this writing,
no real steps seem to have been taken in his office to engineer an exchange of the type we
describe.
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managers nor their investors were willing to pay.177
2. Interviews with Fund Managers and Bankers. We learned
through the interviews with government debt managers that they
looked primarily to their investor bases to discern whether there was a
demand for changing boilerplate language. Thus, for our final set of
interviews, we talked to fifteen of the financial firms that purchase, and
sometimes litigate, sovereign debt contracts.178 To the extent these
firms are holding sovereign bonds at the time of a crisis—and the firms
held bonds in every recent sovereign debt crisis, including Argentina,
Greece, Ukraine and Cyprus—they could see firsthand how the legal
terms of the contract can matter a great deal once default looms. Our
starting premise was that these firms were making decisions about
which bonds to buy and sell—and, at least indirectly, what messages to
convey to the debt managers—as a function of the contract provisions
in the bonds.179
As a general matter, the investors indicated that they did not
consult their in-house lawyers for advice on which bonds to buy as a
function of the legal terms.180 Legal terms, the investors said, are not
relevant until very late in the game when the sovereign is trying
desperately to avoid default.181 It is only when those efforts fail that the
lawyers are asked to determine what the legal terms mean and whether
they might provide an advantage or disadvantage in restructuring
negotiations.182 This practice seemed inconsistent with rational
investment strategy. If contract terms such as the form of the pari passu
clause mattered ex post, in a near default state, ceteris paribus, they
necessarily should matter ex ante when the bonds are issued as well.183
Many of the players at the investment firms had quantitative
backgrounds and so they understood the puzzle precisely. The
explanation offered was the market reality. No one paid attention to
anything but whether the bond had the “standard documentation”;
that is, not until the very end, when everyone scrambled to find a good

177. This exhortation to change the terms of earlier-issued bonds came publicly from the
director of the IMF, Christine Lagarde, at the June 2016 meetings of the Paris Club. Email from
Isabelle Couet to Authors (2016) (on file with authors).
178. See Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 168, at 4, 50–51.
179. Id. at 1–2.
180. Id. at 50.
181. Id. at 50–51.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 51.
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lawyer to tell them what their documents mean.184 In short, what
matters to the investors at the front end of the transaction is that the
boilerplate legal terms are standard. What is not relevant is how the
legal terms in that standard might affect the price of the bond once the
sovereign debtor approaches default. Consequently, it does not matter
what precisely constitutes the standard legal terms.
IV. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
We have been gathering data on the pari passu puzzle for more than a
decade. At first glance, the empirical evidence collected—both
quantitative and qualitative—seems puzzling and even confounding.
Contract theory predicts that contract drafters will revise standard
contract terms when faced with an interpretation adverse to their
clients’ interests.185 That no more than a handful of corrective changes
were made to the pari passu boilerplate for over three years after a
federal court in New York endorsed the ratable payments
interpretation, and roughly fourteen years after the Brussels decision,
is perplexing. This is especially true because the drafting lawyers, and
the entire sovereign bond industry, were nearly unanimous in
condemning the series of judicial decisions that permitted the holdout
creditors to prevail. Moreover, when clarifying revisions began to
appear, they seemed to be prompted by two conferences held in New
York in October 2014, rather than by the succession of adverse court
decisions by the leading commercial courts in the United States.
Adding to the mystery, the clarifying revisions that began to appear in
many bond issues in late 2014 were limited to bonds issued directly by
a sovereign. But virtually no such changes have yet been made to pari

184. Id. at 50.
185. The standard view in contract theory assumes that sophisticated parties have a better
understanding of what the terms in their contracts mean than do courts, and thus have a
corresponding incentive and capacity to revise those terms when necessary. For articulations of
this view, see generally Meredith R. Miller, Contract Law, Party Sophistication and the New
Formalism, 75 MO. L. REV. 493 (2010) and Schwartz & Scott, supra note 1. The economics
literature on standard form contracts suggests that boilerplate contract terms might sometimes be
slow to change because of network or learning externalities—such as the value of having identical
terms that everyone understands and can easily and accurately price and litigate because
understanding their legal meaning has become widespread. That rationale may apply in the case
of some types of boilerplate contract terms, but the black holes that we examine are clauses whose
meaning has dissipated over time and whose pricing is nonexistent. The classic statement of the
externality argument is in Kahan & Klausner, supra note 34, at 715–17. For an argument that the
Kahan and Klausner argument does not apply to the pari passu context, see GULATI & SCOTT,
supra note 10, at ch. 6.
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passu clauses in bonds issued by sub-sovereigns even where those
bonds are guaranteed by the same sovereigns whose own pari passu
clauses have been repaired.186
Notwithstanding the apparent contradictions, however, a story
does emerge from the data. This is not the only story that explains the
pari passu puzzle, but it is the only explanation that fits all the data
sources collected. What follows, then, is first an effort to connect the
dots by integrating both the quantitative and qualitative data.
Thereafter, we address the question with which we began: What
interpretive rule would better motivate courts to avoid systemic costs
when asked to determine the legal meaning in encrusted boilerplate
like the pari passu clause?
A. More on Collective Action with a Heavy Dose of Agency Costs
The evidentiary vacuum accompanying a black hole will deter
contracting parties from simply unilaterally changing the language of
the black hole after an aberrant court interpretation. First movers are
unable to rely on contextual cues to discern the true meaning of the
black hole clause, and the resulting uncertainty creates the risk of
idiosyncrasy in a world that depends on standardization. To take just
one example, where one party moves unilaterally but others continue
to use the same term, the moving party faces a heightened risk that
subsequent courts will view the change as confirming the first court’s
interpretation. At the same time, the first mover also faces uncertainty
about how the market will interpret the meaning of the revised clause.
These inertia costs undermine the incentives to change the actual
language of the clause until market participants are able collectively to
send a signal rejecting the aberrant court interpretation and adopting
a new market standard.
1. The Coordination Problem: Private Versus Collective Interests.
But how can parties in the market coordinate to act collectively? In
certain markets, the coordination problem is made worse by the
perverse incentives of critical market participants that hinder the
186. This is not the case with all the sovereigns in the data because some of the highest-rated
issuers have no legal clauses at all in their pure sovereign bonds, but have legal clauses, including
pari passu, in their sub-sovereign issuances. When we spoke to the debt managers of these issuers,
however, they indicated that they would of course revise the pari passu clauses in their pure
sovereign bonds if that were needed. But since they issue sovereign bonds without any legal terms,
there is no problem with those bonds. When asked about their quasi-sovereign bonds, they
generally expressed surprise.
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market’s ability to overcome the collective action constraint. In the
case of the sovereign debt market, the private interests of key
participants—the elite lawyers and their clients, the representatives of
the sovereigns and the investors—are inconsistent with those parties’
collective interests. The collective interests of the lawyers are to
protect the industry and the market for sovereign bonds so that future
issuances proceed smoothly and future business can grow. Yet, the
private interests of the same set of lawyers are the mirror image of the
interests of their de facto clients, the debt managers and the investment
banks. And both sets of agents are subject to hyperbolic discounting:
they are motivated to reduce the ex ante costs of a bond issue even
where expected ex post costs are thereby increased by an even greater
amount.187 This hyperbolic discounting problem exists whenever
contracting parties pay more attention to the ex ante or front-end costs
of the contract than to the ex post or back-end costs of a later default.188
This, then, presents a problem that seems unique to boilerplate
that has become a black hole. In the case of boilerplate that has been
litigated or otherwise updated over time, for example by an industry
group, and thus has a recognized contextual meaning, coordination is
more tractable. The extant interpretation economizes on transaction
costs by providing a focal point that aligns the parties’ expectations and
thus permits them to solve the coordination problem more
efficiently.189 Parties who participate in the sovereign debt market are
involved in a mixed motive game. They coordinate on certain
expectations but have conflicting interests on others. One way they
align their expectations is through shared meaning. When the parties
can communicate a shared meaning, experiments show that their
“cheap talk” facilitates coordination.190 As Schelling famously noted,

187. Excessive discounting by agents thus leads to bond issuances that are less efficient than
they could be. An efficient sovereign bond contract optimizes total contracting costs by trading
off the ex ante or front-end costs of the contract and the ex post or back-end costs of default. For
discussion, see Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design,
115 YALE L.J. 814, 822–25 (2006).
188. See id. at 822–39 (describing the costs when contracting parties prioritize front end or
back end costs at the expense of the other).
189. The presence of a focal point seems to explain the market’s ability to coordinate within
several years to reach the unanimity required among investors to revise collective action clauses.
See generally Choi et al., supra note 15 (discussing focal points as a possible means of encouraging
parties to coordinate).
190. See, e.g., Vincent Crawford, A Survey of Experiments on Communication via Cheap Talk,
78 J. ECON. THEORY 286, 287 (1998) (“[W]hen players’ preferences are sufficiently close,
communication via cheap talk can be informative.”).
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when the problem is selecting one means of coordinating among many,
focal point solutions stand out and attract the attention of both
parties.191 Once announced, the focal point default economizes on
costly precontractual communications: this function is especially
valuable when the parties have different possible ways to coordinate,
and there is no consensus on how to do so.
This means of coordination is absent in the case of contractual
black holes because any attempt at a collective revision to the clause
first has to be “settled” among the key players, since those same private
interests demand “standard” legal terms that reduce ex ante costs.192
The absence of any focal point of meaning conflicts with the high
demand for standard terms. If the term in question is one that is on a
proverbial checklist, then it is the type of term that an investor expects
to see in a sovereign bond.193
This collective action problem is exacerbated by the agency costs
that seem to pervade the sovereign bond market194 and that explain the
apparent inconsistency between the expressions of distress over the
pari passu litigation by the elite bar and their concomitant
unwillingness or inability to effect any change in the standard
boilerplate language. It also explains why there finally was substantial
movement to revise the pure sovereign issuances in late fall 2014 and
why this apparently coordinated decision to revise pari passu was not
followed in the quasi-sovereign bonds that were issued during the same
time frame. In what follows, we support the collective action/agency
cost story by describing in more detail the respective individual and
collective interests of each of the principal parties.

191. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 54–55 (1980).
192. In short, the issuers faced a tradeoff: They could either insert language shutting down the
hedge funds who might buy up the bonds in times of future distress, but in doing so their action
could be construed as watering down a pledge that purchasers had come to expect as a promise
of equal treatment. Ex ante, the issuers did not know which move would affect the price of their
bonds more. So they adopted a wait and see attitude. Eventually, once they had some assurance
that most other sovereign issuers would change the language, meaning they would be at no
competitive disadvantage, the big issuers at least agreed to a change.
193. One way to understand the stickiness of terms that make it on to the checklist is to see
them as category defining terms. Scholars in sociology have long observed the importance
attached, even by sophisticated market actors, to whether products fit certain defined
categories—for example, a vehicle is not a car unless it has four wheels, and only if it is a car will
it get rated by car magazines and evaluated by car experts and sold by car dealers and so on. See,
e.g., Ezra W. Zuckerman, The Categorical Imperative: Securities Analysts and the Illegitimacy
Discount, 104 AM. J. SOC. 1398, 1398–1406 (1999).
194. See GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 10, at ch. 10.
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2. The Incentives of the Elite Lawyers. The private interest of each
of the lawyers who dominate the sovereign bond market is to process
bond issues at the least ex ante cost and as quickly as possible,
notwithstanding expected default costs.195 This single-minded focus on
reducing front-end contracting costs is simply a reflection of the fact
that the “legal terms,” for which the lawyers are responsible and that
form the standard boilerplate, are seen as immaterial to both sellers
and buyers in the initial pricing of the bonds. Thus, any change in the
risk of default that results from a change in the legal terms of the
contract is ignored by both the debt managers, who act as agent for the
sovereign, and the investment bank, which serves as agent for the
investors. In short, the ex ante legal meaning of pari passu is irrelevant
to both sides of the transaction as is the fact that this particular clause
has no understood ex ante meaning: it is a black hole with random
variations that are meaningless encrustations. This makes pari passu a
much more difficult problem to repair once the inertia costs of an
aberrant interpretation become salient. Nevertheless, the pari passu
clause remains a part of the bonds’ contractual boilerplate because it is
part of the “standard form,” and standardization is valued because it
reduces ex ante contracting costs.196
When Elliott Associates succeeded in having a court adopt the
ratable payments interpretation in Brussels in 2000, the elite bar was
outraged but not because any lawyer’s individual interests were
imperiled. As we know, their clients did not care. The lawyers were
outraged, in unison with the public sector and other collective groups,
because they saw that the ratable payment interpretation imperiled the
health of the industry itself. If bonds in default cannot be restructured,
then over time the pressure from the vulture funds whenever a
sovereign faces default will reduce the demand for issuing debt in this
form and the robust market for sovereign bonds will be negatively
impacted. This means a decline in a lucrative legal business. The
collective interests of the lawyers who dominate this industry is to
maintain a thriving sovereign bond market where bond issues are
produced on an assembly line.197 And this way of doing business was
threatened.
195. Id.
196. For discussions of the value of standardized provisions, see Goetz & Scott, supra note 5,
at 286–88 and Kahan & Klausner, supra note 34, at 719–29.
197. For discussion of the three-and-a-half-minute transaction and the mass production of
boilerplate contracts, see GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 10, at ch. 10. See also Richman, supra note
33, at 79–82 (drawing an analogy to Henry Ford’s production line for cars).
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At the same time, these lawyers had no incentive to revise the
standard terms for their individual clients. The debt managers for the
sovereigns do not care about the legal terms at the time of issuance:
they do not regard the legal terms as relevant to the initial pricing of
their bonds because they know that the investment banks charged with
marketing the bonds only care about having the standard form.
Moreover, the clients affirmatively discourage individualized
deviations from the boilerplate formulation because nonstandard legal
terms make the initial issuance more difficult and costly to get to
market. Thus, the lawyers repeatedly demanded that the state solve the
problem but did nothing themselves other than to offer empty
platitudes about why they failed to act.198
This saga continued for nearly 15 years until one lawyer at the
October 2014 Columbia conference committed a gaffe by telling the
truth: “We don’t know how to respond to this problem because the
interests of our clients are not identical, and many clients do not ask
for or want any change in the standard legal terms.”199 The evidence
points to the fact that this session, and the subsequent meeting of an
elite subset of the same basic group a few weeks later, was the impetus
for coordinating a move to a revised (though equally ambiguous) pari
passu clause. The lingering agency problem for the elite bar is that the
de jure client is the “true sovereign”—the people or at least the duly
constituted government—and not just the debt managers. And it is not
at all clear that those interests are advanced by treating all sovereigns
as having the same default risk and issuing standardized boilerplate for
sovereign bonds despite the apparent variance in the probability of a
future restructuring between developed countries and developing
nations.
3. The Sovereigns’ Incentives. The sovereign’s interests are also
skewed by an agency problem. Sovereigns have a long-term interest in
having the capacity to restructure their debt. But because they have not
incentivized their agents correctly, those interests are
underrepresented in the state’s bureaucracy. Thus, the debt managers
care primarily about what the investors claim to care about—the
198. The exception in this story should be the restructuring lawyers and perhaps their clients.
These lawyers are going to face the consequences of having suboptimal contract terms. So, one
should predict that when they have the opportunity to remedy terms after a restructuring, they
will. And, as reported, we see precisely that—the bonds that have the first changes tend to be
those in restructurings. See Choi et al., supra note 15, at 26.
199. Audio tape: Columbia Law School Meeting, supra note 146.

CHOI GULATI SCOTT IN PRINTER FINAL_KK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

64

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

9/25/2017 2:10 PM

[Vol. 67:1

business terms that they believe do influence bond prices—and they
want the legal terms to remain unchanged and uncontroversial so as to
secure the best initial price at the lowest issuance cost.200 In short, the
sovereign’s agents engage in hyperbolic discounting because that is
what they are paid to do. Nevertheless, theory predicts that some
(many) sovereigns will have issued bonds prior to the revisions to pari
passu that risk imposing substantial costs on their country’s citizens in
the future.
4. The Investors’ Incentives. But why don’t the investors who buy
the bonds care about the ability to restructure in the event of default?
This is a difficult question, but one hypothesis is that it is too costly to
try and match a given sovereign with the optimal clause. Some
sovereigns may present a measurable default risk while others may not,
and the information to make particularized ex ante calculations is
costly to acquire, especially in a world of encrusted boilerplate of
uncertain meaning. The same holds for the information needed to
quantify how changes in pari passu will alter the present value of future
repayment if default occurs. A rationalist skeptic might ask: Why is the
market so imperfect? Behavioral theory may explain part of the answer
as being a function of excessive discounting.201 Another consideration
is the fact that this is a liquid market where bonds can easily be resold
on the secondary market. In such an environment, the business terms
and the bond’s rating are a good enough proxy for future default risks
especially where boilerplate terms have been stripped over time of
comprehensible legal consequences.
But the preceding does not answer one remaining question: If Jay
Newman, Elliott’s legendary legal arbitrageur, prides himself on
reading the bond contracts once default looms in order to capture rents
as a holdout creditor, then doesn’t it follow that he and other hedge
fund hotshots will read the bond contracts at the time of issuance as
well?202 This implies that there should be arbitrage in the primary

200. Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 168, at 11–12.
201. See Steffen Andersen, Glenn W. Harrison, Morten I. Lau & E. Elisabet Rutström,
Discounting Behavior: A Reconsideration, 71 EUR. ECON. REV. 15, 15–16 (2014); Shane
Frederick, George Loewenstein & Ted O’Donoghue, Time Discounting and Time Preference: A
Critical Review, 40 J. ECON. LIT. 351, 393–94 (2002).
202. See GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 10, at 158–59; see also Michelle Celarier, Mitt Romney’s
Hedge Fund Kingmaker, FORTUNE (Mar. 26, 2012), http://fortune.com/2012/03/26/mitt-romneyshedge-fund-kingmaker [https://perma.cc/T6LU-US7B] (describing Elliott’s strategy of figuring
out what the documents actually say).
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market where smart investors selectively buy bonds based on their
reading of the legal terms: even if the initial purchasers do not plan to
be there when default looms, they know that Jay Newman and others
will pay a higher price for the bonds with better contract terms in that
near-default scenario.203 To be sure, investors act as though the risk of
a default without the ability to restructure is too remote to affect initial
price. But will the market adjust if hedge funds engage in arbitrage ex
ante as well as ex post? Perhaps not. The tradeoff between the ex ante
moral hazard risk of a future restructuring and the ex post returns of a
successful restructuring to creditors is difficult to assess. So long as the
initial investors only bear some of the price risk caused by legal
arbitrage, it still may be rational for them to buy bonds without
discriminating among legal terms that influence the costs of default.
5. The Role of the Public Sector and Industry Associations. The
IMF, the Paris Club, the Institute of International Finance, ICMA, and
so on only have collective interests. Why was it so hard to coordinate
with the leading lawyers to solve the problem much earlier? The best
inference from the data is that the pari passu clause was emptied of any
context that could help determine its most plausible meaning, thus
increasing the risks of error to actors who were motivated to revise
their boilerplate. What should they do without any context that could
point to a plausible meaning to use as a benchmark?204 Under these
conditions, the collective interests believed that the expected costs of
litigation in the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court (discounted by
the probability of prevailing) were lower than the costs of coordination
given that the elite members of the bar were individually reluctant to
do anything. Thus, so long as the courts could be expected to get it right
in the end, coordination costs were too onerous.
203. There are a number of recent research papers showing that key contract terms such as
governing law come into play in near-default scenarios. See, e.g., Andrew Clare & Nicolas
Schmidlin, The Impact of Foreign Governing Law on European Government Bond Yields 2–5
(Mar. 8, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2406477 [https://perma.cc/3APL-G6UE]; Julian Schumacher, Marcos Chamon &
Christoph Trebesch, Foreign Law Bonds: Can They Reduce Sovereign Borrowing Costs? 1–5
(Mar. 1, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/113199 [https://
perma.cc/7GWL-7DSE].
204. It is useful to compare a clause such as pari passu where the range of meanings is unaided
by any context evidence with ordinary vagueness. For example, a contract that calls for the
delivery of 100 “dark red” Macintosh apples is vague because the term does not precisely
determine what constitutes a conforming apple; how dark red must the apples be? Nevertheless,
in such a case courts can revert to context to resolve the meaning of the contract term. Pari passu
lacked any such context to aid in fixing its meaning.

CHOI GULATI SCOTT IN PRINTER FINAL_KK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

66

9/25/2017 2:10 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 67:1

This then leaves the last part of the story. How did they get it
done? Recall that solving the collective action problem not only
required a willingness to consider the collective interest over private
interests but the parties had to coordinate around a common
formulation in order to substitute a new standard term in place of the
defective one. At the Columbia conference in October 2014, many of
the elite lawyers were openly critical of the clarification proposed by
the IMF-led process. Yet, once they were invited to a second meeting
limited to the most elite among them and asked to participate in solving
a common problem of global significance, the attendees quickly and
easily reached an agreement and revisions began to appear from that
point onward. Is it really true that status and flattery were all that was
needed to do the trick? Was the Columbia conference an important
first step for the elite bar to recognize that they all shared the same
private and collective interests?205 Our data cannot answer these last
questions but we do know that the lawyers who were in the room at
both the Columbia and New York Federal Reserve meetings in
October 2014 represented the pure sovereign issuers doing offerings
under New York and English law.206 And that is precisely where the
standard revision has now become the norm, whereas other lawyers
who were not invited to the meeting with the IMF—often partners at
the same law firms as the elite cohort—represent subsidiary sovereign
interests that have yet to coordinate around a revision that rejects the
ratable payments gloss.
B. What Should Courts Do with Contractual Black Holes?
The standard interpretive principle courts are instructed to use in
ascertaining the meaning of a contract term to which both parties have
manifested assent is to look for the shared intent of the contracting
parties.207 Intent, in turn, is determined both objectively and
prospectively: A party is taken to mean what its contract partner could
205. One of the key policymakers from the U.S. Treasury told us in January 2016 that, looking
back, persuading ICMA to be involved was especially important. ICMA was, at the time, trying
to demonstrate to the market that it was a key actor and worth joining. ICMA, in other words,
had its own incentives to show the market that it was an important player and could engineer big
changes. But our data show that the ICMA publication of draft clauses, which were released
officially in August 2014 but drafts of which were circulated as early as January 2014, was not
enough to induce change on the market. The catalysis appears to have occurred in October 2014.
206. Within this group, the lawyers representing Latin American sovereigns were
disproportionately represented as they tend to do issuances primarily under New York law.
207. Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the Structure of Contractual Intent,
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1023, 1025 (2009).
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plausibly believe it meant when the parties contracted.208 Textualist
theories undergird the New York courts’ doctrines of contractual
interpretation that are designed to uncover the objectively reasonable,
ex ante intent of the parties. Textualist jurisdictions, such as New York,
use a “hard” parol evidence rule that gives presumptively conclusive
effect to merger or integration clauses,209 and, in the same spirit, this
approach bars context evidence suggesting that parties intended to
impart nonstandard meaning to language that, read alone, is
unambiguous.210
There is a powerful justification for giving boilerplate terms in
commercial contracts their plain or standard dictionary meaning:
creating standard vocabularies for the conduct of commercial
transactions is a valuable state function.211 When a phrase has a set,
easily discoverable meaning, parties who use it will know what the
phrase requires of them and what courts will say the phrase requires.
By insulating the standard meaning of terms from deviant
interpretations, this strategy preserves a valuable collective good,
namely a set of terms with clear, unambiguous meanings that are
already understood by the vast majority of commercial parties.212
But the preceding exposes a dilemma that courts confront when
applying a plain meaning analysis to standard boilerplate such as the
pari passu clause: the interpreter must somehow distinguish between
meaningful language and empty boilerplate. Moreover, this problem is
not solved simply by arguing that courts should instead adopt a
contextualist interpretive style.213 Contractual black holes are

208. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 1, at 568–69.
209. Merger clauses are given virtually conclusive effect in New York. See Tempo Shain Corp.
v. Bertek, Inc., 120 F.3d 16, 21 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Ordinarily, a merger clause provision indicates
that the subject agreement is completely integrated, and parol evidence is precluded from altering
or interpreting the agreement.”); Norman Bobrow & Co. v. Loft Realty Co., 577 N.Y.S.2d 36, 36
(N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (“Parol evidence is not admissible to vary the terms of a written contract
containing a merger clause.”).
210. The New York courts’ plain meaning rule addresses the question of what legal meaning
should be attributed to the contract terms that the parol evidence rule has identified: when words
or phrases appear to be unambiguous, extrinsic evidence of a possible contrary meaning is
inadmissible. For a discussion of the different parol evidence rules and their effect on contract
drafting, see generally Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, 119
YALE L.J. 926 (2010).
211. See Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 NW. U. L. REV.
847, 853–56 (2000).
212. Goetz & Scott, supra note 5, at 286–88.
213. Contextualists argue that formal interpretive rules that exclude certain categories of
extrinsic evidence deprive the fact finder of indispensable information relevant to deciding the
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acontextual: the variations in language among different version of the
clause are essentially random and thus context evidence does not aid
in determining plausible meanings. This suggests that both textualist
and contextualist courts are well advised to interpose a further step
when interpreting standardized terms in commercial contracts.
At a minimum, courts should be open to arguments that, as a
matter of law, the clause in question has been emptied of meaning and
functions as a black hole in the boilerplate. To be sure, the moral
hazard risk of false claims by a party who has been disadvantaged by
fate argues for a strong presumption against the existence of a black
hole. But there should be an opportunity to admit evidence sufficient
to overcome that initial presumption against encrustation. The
evidence described above is illustrative of the proof that the parties
alleging encrustation might proffer. Has the clause been repeated by
rote over many years, without having been tested in litigation, where
repetition has robbed the term of any obvious conventional meaning?
Has the term been embedded in layers of legal jargon such that its
intelligibility is substantially reduced and variations in the formulation
of the term across contracts have no apparent significance?214 Is a
historic or original meaning of the term accessible in a fashion that
makes sense in the contemporary context and are contemporary
commercial actors aware of that meaning? Is there credible evidence
that the particular provision was priced at the original issue stage?215

case and thus can distort the court’s assessment of what the parties meant by their agreement.
Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Text and Context: Contract Interpretation
as Contract Design, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 23, 36 (2014). Contextualist jurisdictions, such as
California, carry this view to its logical limit and reject the notion that words in a contract can
have a plain or unambiguous—context free—meaning at all. Id. By the same logic they favor a
soft parol evidence rule. Id. at 37. Here the test for integration admits extrinsic evidence
notwithstanding an unambiguous merger clause or, absent such a clause, notwithstanding the fact
that the writing appears final and complete on its face. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas
Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 645 (Cal. 1968) (“[R]ational interpretation requires at least
a preliminary consideration of all credible evidence offered to prove the intention of the
parties.”); Masterson v. Sine, 436 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968) (admitting parol evidence to vary terms
of deed on ground that “[e]vidence of oral collateral agreements should be excluded only when
the fact finder is likely to be misled”).
214. A critic might ask whether what we call “layers of legal jargon” or “encrustation” is being
dismissed unfairly as meaningless. After all, these encrustations, like the insertion of the word
“payment” into the pari passu clause sometime in the 1970s, were presumably chosen by a lawyer
to make the clause clearer or more advantageous for the client. If the variation was consciously
chosen, is it not the very opposite of meaningless jargon? Our response is that the key is whether
the underlying core clause has any shared meaning. If not, then adding language intended to
clarify increases rather than reduces the linguistic uncertainty infecting the core clause.
215. Based on what we have learned, it probably does not mean much if we do not find a
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If a court finds strong evidence of rote usage and encrustation in
standard boilerplate, the presumption of shared meaning is no longer
apt: when encrusted boilerplate is repeated by rote for many years
without legal challenge, and no party has reason to know a different
meaning attached to the clause by another party, the clause has become
a legal black hole. What we have learned about black holes from our
study of the pari passu litigation and its aftermath is that third parties
can play a constructive role in facilitating coordination by the market
on a new standard term. A court intent on facilitating coordination by
groups such as the IMF could adopt the presumption that the evidence
of a black hole implies that the parties attached different meanings to
the term in question. This presumption invokes the common law rule
that if parties have attached different meanings to a term neither party
is bound by the meaning of the other unless at the time of contracting
one party did not know or have reason to know the meaning of the
counter party, who in turn did know or have reason to know the
meaning of the first party.216 Applying this principle to the NML v.
Argentina case, and assuming neither party knew or had reason to
know of the other’s different ex ante understanding, a court could find
that neither party’s interpretation of pari passu was legally relevant.
Reading the clause out of the contract in this way permits textualist
courts to maintain their commitment to plain language interpretation
and also allows contextualist courts to continue to invite extrinsic
evidence of the meaning of contested terms.
To be sure, the state could advance the parties’ interest in solving
their collective action problems in other ways, say, by engaging in just
the sort of “public/private” coordination efforts that ultimately
succeeded in resolving the pari passu saga. In general, regulatory
solutions of that sort are preferable to a court’s resolution of the black
hole conundrum because they operate generally and not just in the
particular case. For this reason, among others, the true lesson of our
study may be that the IMF and other groups that constitute the “official
sector” may be better able than courts to solve these problems over
time as they gain experience and become more confident in their

pricing effect. See Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 168, at 11–12. But if we do find an effect, it
probably means that the clause was intended to have a specific discernible meaning.
216. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 201(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1981). In the case
where one party does not know the meaning of the other and the other does know or have reason
to know the meaning of the first party, the term is interpreted in accordance with the meaning
asserted by the first party. See id. § 201(2).
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methods.217 If this is so, then even though the pari passu case shows that
the intervention of a public authority is sometimes required to solve
contractual disputes that have third-party effects, relying on the courts
rather than private ordering to craft the solution may not always be the
best choice.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have sought to support three claims. First,
contractual black holes can exist as a by-product of the standardization
of boilerplate in commercial markets. The boilerplate production
process can generate random variations in language that are not the
product of rational contract design. Nonetheless, these variations
persist and are cemented over time as part of the market standard.
Second, while black holes often remain for many years as relatively
harmless surplusage, they can generate substantial social costs once
litigation results in an interpretation that introduces inefficiencies into
the market. These encrustations then invite opportunistic litigation and
require costly collective efforts to repair the now vulnerable terms.
Third, those costs are a function of the inherently greater inertia costs
that result from an aberrant interpretation of a black hole term and the
greater difficulty market players face in overcoming the resulting
collective action problem.
We have used the pari passu litigation as a prototypical exemplar
of the substantial costs that result from inefficient interpretations of
black holes, costs that are exacerbated when the interpretations are
advanced by contractual arbitrageurs, such as Elliott Associates and
NML Capital, Ltd. Indeed, the costs of pari passu in taxpayer payouts
to holdout creditors are already enormous and likely to increase even
further.218 As we write this paper, Venezuela is on the verge of default
on upwards of $75 billion of debt.219 Among its bonds are those with
different versions of the pari passu clause, including the low risk Rank
version and the high risk Rank in Payment version. Comparisons of the
217. We are grateful to Lisa Bernstein for this observation.
218. Among the largest of these payouts are the recoveries of holdouts against Argentina in
March 2016, with recoveries estimated in the 1000 percent range for some hedge funds. See Martin
Guzman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Opinion, How Hedge Funds Held Argentina for Ransom, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/01/opinion/how-hedge-funds-heldargentina-for-ransom.html [https://perma.cc/U6MR-SACR].
219. E.g., Dimitra DeFotis, 2 Venezuela Bond Strategies as Debt Default Looms, BARRONS:
EMERGING MKTS. DAILY (Mar. 22, 2017), http://www.barrons.com/articles/2-venezuela-bondstrategies-as-debt-default-looms-1490202932 [https://perma.cc/YH27-6PJK].
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price differentials among the bonds that isolate differences other than
the contract provisions suggest that holdout activity is driving the
widening spreads among the bonds, with an increasingly higher yield
for the low risk Rank version that provides less opportunity for
holdouts.220 Here the resulting social cost is a function of the fact that,
despite the revisions that are common in new bonds issued after
October 2014, few if any sovereigns have sought to modify the terms of
their older bonds.
A natural question to ask is whether our study is idiosyncratic.
Perhaps the pari passu clause is a unique example of the costs of
encrustation. We do not have a good answer to this question, other
than to note the number of recent papers exploring similar problems
in other standard markets221 and that within the sovereign debt contract
itself there are other terms that are potential black holes. An example
described elsewhere is the standard negative pledge clause, a clause
that is on the standard checklist, and appears in almost every sovereign
bond. Yet, a negative pledge term seems to have little contemporary
meaning since sovereigns stopped pledging assets as a backstop to their
debt more than seventy-five years ago.222 And even if they did pledge
assets, what would it mean to have pledges that rank equally in a
context where seizing a foreign sovereign’s assets in its own country is
impossible in the modern era?
Outside of the sovereign bond context we have seen suspected
black holes similar to pari passu in local municipal bonds in the United
States. A frequent practice with these municipal bonds, of which tens
of billions of dollars are outstanding, is that they are backed by pledges
of revenues of the local governments.223 Sometimes the pledges of
220. See Elena Carletti, Paolo Colla, Mitu Gulati & Steven Ongena, Pricing Contract Terms
in a Crisis: Venezuelan Bonds in 2016, CAP. MKTS. L.J. 540, 546 (2016) (comparing the pricing on
Venezuelan sovereign bonds with similar maturities, but differing pari passu and collective action
clauses); see also John Dizard, ‘Complete Chaos in Caracas’ Invites Vulture Fest, FIN. TIMES (Sept.
2, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/432c9f02-70f0-11e6-9ac1-1055824ca907 [https://perma.cc/
4XHZ-WGMG] (discussing how vulture funds have begun to find investing in Venezuela
attractive).
221. See supra note 17.
222. See Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott, Contractual Arbitrage, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Eric Brousseau, Jean-Michel Galmant & Jerome
Sgaard eds., forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 21–22), http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=6304&context=faculty_scholarship [https://perma.cc/VC3Y-QLKN].
223. The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico’s bonds, that are in distress as of this writing, provide
an illustration of the range of these pledges. See Tim Worstall, The Truly Horrible and Ghastly
Mess of Puerto Rico’s Bond Issuance, FORBES (May 6, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
timworstall/2017/05/06/the-truly-horrible-and-ghastly-mess-of-puerto-ricos-bond-
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revenues are of the general tax revenues, and sometimes there are
specific streams of revenues from a utility or similar entity. An issue
that has become salient in the context of the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, which has over $50 billion of these types of bonds at risk of
default, is how these revenues can be enforced if the Commonwealth
or some other such entity defaults. Would a federal or state judge be
willing to issue an order asking the government in question to stop
doing repairs on its roads or providing basic services to inhabitants in
order to pay a contract arbitrageur? Alternatively, is there a risk that
the court would order the local government to raise taxes to pay the
creditors? And what if the inhabitants simply moved to avoid the
taxes? These kinds of revenue pledges are ubiquitous in the U.S.
municipal bond market—and there are many variations in how they
are formulated, variations that are supposedly priced224—and yet, no
one seems to know how they would work.
In short, black holes do exist in standard boilerplate contracts that
are used all over the world to regulate important markets. And the
principal lesson of the pari passu saga is that once a black hole is
discovered and then exploited by a contractual arbitrageur, the social
costs of coordinating a move to solve the problem collectively can be
extremely high.

issuance/#7405bea54224 [https://perma.cc/9YF8-8GMR]. For a general overview of municipal
bonds, see CRAIG L. JOHNSON, MARTIN J. LUBY & TIMA T. MOLDOGAZIEV, STATE AND LOCAL
FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS: POLICY CHANGES AND MANAGEMENT 12–14 (2014) and NEIL
O’HARA, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF MUNICIPAL BONDS 36 (6th ed. 2012).
224. See Mark D. Robbins & Bill Simonsen, Municipal Securities, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 795, 797–98 (Jack Rabin ed., 2003).
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APPENDIX
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Figure 1: Percent of Issuances by All Issuers with Any Change
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Figure 2: Dollar Amount of Issuances for All Issuers Excluding those
Issuers with a Rank Initial Pari Passu Clause
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Figure 3: Percent of Pure Sovereigns under Foreign Law with Major
Change

CHOI GULATI SCOTT IN PRINTER FINAL_KK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

76

9/25/2017 2:10 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 67:1

12/2011

10/2012

8/2013

6/2014

8/2014

10/1/2014

Figure 4: Percent of Pure Sovereigns under Foreign Law with Minor
Change
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Figure 5: Percentage of Sovereign Issuances by Year with Specific Type
of Pari Passu Clause

